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Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence1 
Mark A. Lemley2 & Christopher R. Leslie3 
 
I. The Role of Categorization in Antitrust Analysis 
A. Modes of Antitrust Analysis 
1. The Per Se Rule 
2. Rule of Reason Analysis 
3. “Quick Look” and the Abbreviated Rule of Reason 
 4. Categories or Continuum? 
B. Characterizing restraints. 
1. Horizontal versus Vertical 
2. Naked versus Ancillary 
3. Voluntary Versus Coerced Restraints 
4.  Unilateral versus Concerted Restraints  
 5. Obsolete Categories 
  a. Price versus Nonprice 
   b. Maximum versus Minimum Pricing 
II. Problems with Reliance on Categorical Analysis. 
 A. Shifting Categories 
  1. Price-Fixing 
  2. Group Boycotts 
  3. Information Exchanges 
 B. Categories Subject to Manipulation. 
  1. Horizontal versus Vertical 
   a. Cooperatives 
   b. Dual Distribution 
   c. Group Boycotts 
   d. Summary 
2. Voluntary versus Coerced. 
  3. Unilateral v. Concerted Conduct 
   a. Is it a Joint Venture? Collaborations Among Competitors 
   b. Dealer Terminations 
   c. Conditional Refusals to Deal 
   d. Who Is a Single Actor? 
C. Categories That Lie: Tying 
                                                
1 (c) 2007 Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie. 
2   William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP. 
3   Visiting Professor of Law, NYU School of Law (Spring 2008); Professor, Chicago-Kent 
College of Law. 
 Yes, we are aware of the irony of writing a taxonomy of the problems with taxonomies. 
 We thank Michael Carrier, Dan Crane, Rose Hagen, Herb Hovenkamp, and Tony Reese 
for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  Remaining mistakes and omissions are 
our responsibility. 
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 D. Categories That Are Nonsensical: Sales versus Licenses 
E. Different Category Labels For the Same Conduct 
 1. Predatory Bundling 
 2. Refusals to License IP Rights 
 3. Tying 
III. A More Nuanced Approach to Antitrust Analysis 
A. The Value of Categories 
 B. Currently, the Costs of Categories Outweigh Their Benefits.  
 C. On the Correct Use of Categories in Antitrust 
  1. The Goals of Antitrust 
  2. The Importance of Empiricism 
 3. Greater Reliance on Antitrust Injury  
  4. Direct Evidence of Anticompetitive Effects 
Conclusion 
 
  In the Scientific Revolution during the Age of Enlightenment, scientists and 
natural philosophers sought to understand the world by categorizing it.  Specimens of 
rocks, plant life, and animal life were collected and sorted into groups based on perceived 
similarities and differences.  For example, animals were cataloged as vertebrates or 
invertebrates based on whether they had backbones.  Ultimately, each living organism 
was categorized into a kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, and, finally, species. 
This process of categorizing the natural world represented a milestone in man’s 
intellectual development.  However, the limitations of this period of scientific progress 
became apparent as over time it became clear that some categories made little sense, 
some individual classification decisions were inaccurate, and some species – notably the 
duck-billed platypus – defied classification altogether.4  As a result, the classification 
schemes had to adapt both as new species were discovered and as old categories proved 
to be ill-conceived.5   
                                                
4 HARRIET RITVO, THE PLATYPUS AND THE MERMAID AND OTHER FIGMENTS OF THE CLASSIFYING 
IMAGINATION 3- 12 (1997). 
5 Id. at 11-17; id at 26 (“Whether or not they appreciated Linneaus’s work, it became increasingly clear to 
eighteenth-century British naturalists – as , indeed, it had been clear to Linneaus himself – that his system 
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 The classification schemes pursued during the Enlightenment and the lessons 
learned during these early attempts at categorization are surprisingly similar to the 
evolution of the common law of antitrust.  But there is an important difference:  in law, 
categories have real consequences.  Calling a platypus as a mammal doesn’t change the 
fact that it lays eggs.6  But calling a particular competitive practice by one name or 
another often has dramatic consequences for whether or not the law permits it.  In this 
article, we suggest that the Enlightenment enthusiasm for taxonomy has run amok in 
antitrust law, with pernicious consequences. 
***************** 
Legal doctrines vary in the extent to which they apply either detailed, categorical 
rules or broad, open-ended standards that allow for case-specific adjudication. We can 
put legal rules on a spectrum from rules to standards. Think of the tax code as the 
paradigm example of specified rules, and of the common law development of doctrines 
such as negligence as the paradigm example of case-specific standards. Other laws fall 
somewhere in between: the securities laws and the patent laws mix specific rules 
governing some aspects of doctrine with broader standards such as Rule 10b5 in 
securities fraud or the doctrine of obviousness in patent law.   
                                                                                                                                            
was artificial, in the sense that it tended to group animals on the basis of single characteristics, such as 
‘dentition or the form of feet,’ often selected largely for classificatory convenience.”). 
6 At least one major scientist of that early era did, in fact, assert that platypuses could not lay eggs, in order 
to defend his own taxonomy of Australian mammals.  Id. at 14 (“In order to defend his position, Owen had 
to deny that the platypus laid eggs, a denial that implicitly identified another way in which the taxonomy of 
Australian mammals had become a representative arena for contests between rival authorities.”).  Many 
other observers confidentally declared that the egg-laying platypus was a hoax.  Id. at 15 (“Several years 
later, while describing a stuffed platypus on display at the Australian pavilion of the Colonial and Indian 
Exhibition, the Illustrated London News smugly reported that ‘fables were formerly told of this queer 
creature, as that it laid eggs.’”). 
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 Antitrust law is generally thought of as inhabiting the standards end of this 
spectrum.7 The basic enabling statutes offer only vague proscriptions against 
“monopolization” or “contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade.”8 
Antitrust’s rule of reason in particular gives courts the power and responsibility to weigh 
the costs and benefits of a particular defendant’s conduct. And numerous courts and 
scholars identify (and often lament) the uncertain, open-ended nature of the basic rule of 
reason inquiry.9 
 In fact, however, despite the generality of the enabling statutes antitrust law is rife 
with categorical distinctions. In Part I, we explore not only the well-known distinction 
between conduct that is per se illegal and conduct judged under the rule of reason, but 
also a number of categorical distinctions the courts draw, either to help delineate the 
scope of the per se rule or to create distinctions within the scope of the rule of reason 
itself. By and large these rules don’t come from the antitrust statutes. They are created by 
courts, who are in effect converting case-specific standards en masse into categorical 
rules. 
 In Part II, we identify a number of problems with these distinctions. One problem 
is administrative: courts spend a great deal of time trying to parse conduct in order to put 
it on one side or another of the lines they have created. Indeed, in many cases courts 
spend more time on categorization than they do on actual economic analysis of the case 
itself. Second, judicial antitrust categories are subject to manipulation. Parties go to great 
lengths to fit into a box that will give them more favorable treatment, sometimes by legal 
                                                
7   See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 Wash. & Lee 
L. Rev. 49 (2007).   
8   15 U.S.C. §§1,2. 
9   See, e.g., Crane, supra note __; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 
1 (1984). 
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argument, sometimes by restructuring a transaction, and sometimes by concealing or 
misrepresenting the facts of that transaction. Third, a number of the categories the courts 
have created make no sense, whether because they have lost their meaning over time, 
because their boundaries have eroded, because they actually tell us very little of relevance 
to the competitive effects of the transaction, or because they are simply dumb. The net 
result is a mess. Categories have become conclusions, displacing the fact-specific 
economic analysis in which antitrust law is supposed to be engaging. 
 In Part III, we argue that there is a better way. We evaluate the costs and benefits 
of the judicial creation of categories, and contend that the complex of antitrust boxes the 
courts have created today does more harm than good.  We don’t mean to suggest there is 
no value to categories, and that everything must be thrown into a pure cost-benefit 
analysis.  Some rules (the per se rule against price fixing, for instance) make sense. 
Rather, the important thing is to make sure that the categories we use have empirical 
support, and that they are communicating valuable information to courts about the 
competitive effects of a general practice. We think the courts have gone too far in the 
creation of rules in a variety of cases. Finally, we suggest that courts make more use than 
they do of certain tools – the doctrine of direct economic effect and  empirical evidence – 
as powerful filters for distinguishing good from bad antitrust claims.  
 
I. The Role of Categorization in Antitrust Analysis. 
Section one of the Sherman Act is notoriously vague.  The statute provides, in 
relevant part, that “[e]very contract … in restraint of trade … is declared to be illegal.”10  
Read literally, the sweep of the language outlaws contracting entirely, as every contract 
                                                
10  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
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restrains trade in some way.11  Resort to legislative history does little to inform our 
interpretation, as it demonstrates only that Congress intended the courts to translate 
section one’s overreaching wording into a workable legal doctrine.  Naturally unwilling 
to interpret section one as broadly as written, the Supreme Court reasoned that section 
one condemns only unreasonable restraints of trade.12  The task for antitrust courts then 
became how to determine whether a particular agreement was, in fact, unreasonable.   
Courts have approached this overarching reasonableness determination through a 
process of categorization.  There are two primary forms of categorical analysis in 
antitrust jurisprudence.  First, the Sherman Act itself distinguishes between unilateral and 
concerted conduct, treating the former under section 2 of the Sherman Act and the latter 
under section 1. Second, the Supreme Court categorized challenged restraints as being 
subject to under either per se illegality or analyzed under the ‘rule of reason.’  Beyond 
these two basic distinctions, courts characterize individual restraints along a series of 
categorical vectors, in large measure to determine which mode of analysis to apply.13 
 
A. Modes of Antitrust Analysis.  
                                                
11 See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (“§ 1 could be 
interpreted to proscribe all contracts”) (citations omitted). 
12 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
13   Dan Crane argues that antitrust is moving from rules towards standards.  Crane, supra note __.  
While this is true in some respects, as the courts have cabined or eliminated per se rules, in many 
cases this weakening of per se rules has taken the form not of replacing per se rules with 
standards, but of building categories to divide per se from rule of reason analysis.  We discuss 
several examples in the sections that follow.   
 Our examples are concentrated in section 1 of the Sherman Act, though we also venture 
into section 2.  For an argument along similar lines confined to section 2 monopolization cases, 
see Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 253, 253 (2003) 
(“Monopolization doctrine currently uses vacuous standards and conclusory labels that provide 
no meaningful guidance about which conduct will be condemned as exclusionary.”). 
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 Federal courts have developed three modes of analysis for determining whether a 
particular agreement unreasonably restrains trade. 
 
1. The Per Se Rule 
 The per se rule provides the most direct mechanism for a plaintiff to establish that 
a challenged restraint of trade is unreasonable. The Supreme Court has explained that 
“there are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on 
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be 
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they 
have caused or the business excuse for their use.”14  Such agreements are per se illegal.  
If a contract or conspiracy falls within the ambit of the per se rule, the plaintiff need not 
prove anticompetitive intent or effect. Nor will the defendant’s purported noble motives 
save the agreement from condemnation.15  The per se rule “allows a court to presume that 
certain limited classes of conduct have an anticompetitive effect without engaging in the 
type of involved, market-specific analysis ordinarily necessary to reach such a 
conclusion.”16 
                                                
14 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 
128, 133 (1998) (some agreements are per se illegal because they “will so often prove so harmful 
to competition and so rarely prove justified that the antitrust laws do not require proof that an 
agreement of that kind is, in fact, anticompetitive in the particular circumstances”); see also 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486-87 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“Per se rules of antitrust illegality are reserved for those situations where logic and 
experience show that the risk of injury to competition from the defendant’s behavior is so 
pronounced that it is needless and wasteful to conduct the usual judicial inquiry into the balance 
between the behavior’s procompetitive benefits and its anticompetitive costs.”). 
15 Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing United 
States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 
(1963)) 
16  Pace Elecs., Inc. v. Canon Computer Sys., Inc., 213 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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The per se rule represents a categorical approach for concluding that a challenged 
restraint is unreasonable.   Since the inception of the per se rule, the Supreme Court has 
consistently acknowledged that the per se rule applies to “[c]ertain categories of 
agreements17 and “permits categorical judgments.”18  In its most recent section one 
opinion, 2007’s Leegin decision, the Court notes that the “per se rule [] treat[s] categories 
of restraints as necessarily illegal.”19  Indeed, since the point of the per se rule is to avoid 
a detailed, case-by-case inquiry into the benefits and harms of particular conduct, it 
would make little sense to have a per se rule that wasn’t categorical.  A practice should 
not be considered illegal per se if courts have to evaluate it on the merits to decide 
whether it qualifies for the per se rule in the first place. 
 
2. Rule of Reason Analysis 
 Generally speaking, agreements that do not fall in a per se category are evaluated 
under the rule of reason.  The vast majority of trade restraint categories receive rule of 
                                                
17 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (“Certain 
categories of agreements, however, have been held to be per se illegal, dispensing with the need 
for case-by-case evaluation.”) (emphasis added). 
18 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 
(1985) (“This per se approach permits categorical judgments with respect to certain business 
practices that have proved to be predominantly anticompetitive.”) (emphasis added); ; see also 
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (referring to “the category 
of per se violations of the Sherman Act”) (emphasis added); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 
(2006) (“the pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture do not fall within the narrow category 
of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act”) (emphasis added). 
 For example, the Court has opined that “[p]rice-fixing agreements between two or more 
competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the category of 
arrangements that are per se unlawful.”  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, (2006) (emphasis 
added); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) 
(“And agreements among competitors to fix prices on their individual goods or services are 
among those concerted activities that the Court has held to be within the per se category.”) 
(emphasis added). 
19  Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). 
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reason treatment.20  In contrast to the per se rule, which eschews in-depth investigation, 
in rule of reason cases “the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in 
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition.”21  Under the rule of reason, courts take “into account a variety 
of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before 
and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”22  
While the inquiry is searching and often wide-ranging, it remains “focuse[d] directly on 
the challenged restraint’s impact on competitive conditions. . . . [T]he rule of reason does 
not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.”23   
 
3. “Quick Look” and the Abbreviated Rule of Reason. 
 The basic division of antitrust jurisprudence into the per se and rule of reason 
categories naturally raises the question of how to decide what conduct is in each box. 
Parties change behavior and characterizations in order to move conduct into one box or 
the other; we discuss a number of ways in which they do so in the next section. But there 
is also a problem we might think of as “meta-characterization”:  how does a court decide 
whether conduct whose legal status is disputed fits into the per se box or the rule of 
reason box?  Logically, courts should think about the economic effects of the conduct in 
order to make the characterization decision. But to ask that question is necessarily to put 
                                                
20 See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,  (1977) (noting that the rule of reason 
is “applied for the majority of anticompetitive practices challenged under section 1 of the Act.”); 
see also Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007); State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
21 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
22 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
23 National Soc’y of Professional Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 696 (1978). 
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the conduct into the rule of reason box, since if the conduct was illegal per se we 
wouldn’t inquire into the balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects. 
 To avoid this conundrum, courts have developed a form of abbreviated or “quick 
look” rule of reason in an effort to characterize disputed conduct.24 The quick look 
approach allows a court to make a decision about whether a new form of conduct that 
appears to be facially anticompetitive should be illegal per se by asking the defendant to 
demonstrate any procompetitive justifications for the conduct. If the defendant can offer 
plausible economic reasons that the conduct is procompetitive, the court will put it in the 
rule of reason box and compare those justifications to the competitive harms. If they 
can’t, the conduct is illegal per se.   
 Properly understood in this way, the quick look is an evidentiary rule that allows 
courts to make categorization decisions without a full-blown economic analysis that 
would eliminate the benefits of the per se rule. In fact, however, some courts have started 
to ossify “quick look” into an intermediate category of its own – a sort of abbreviated rule 
of reason. This seems the only explanation for the Court’s decision in California Dental, 
for instance.25  There, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s abbreviated inquiry into a 
price-fixing agreement among dentists, holding that a full rule of reason analysis was 
required.26  The entire debate makes no sense if “quick look” is, as originally intended, a 
way of deciding whether to put conduct into the per se or rule of reason boxes.  Instead, 
the Court seems to have treated “quick look” as a box in and of itself.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court in its most recent foray into the issue referred to quick look in passing as 
                                                
24   See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
25   California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
26   Id. at 784-87. 
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a third category of analysis.27 The result is that we end up not with two categories, but 
three: the per se rule, the rule of reason, and a middle category that is not quite per se 
illegality, but rather an option the defendant can convert to a rule of reason approach if 
they can make a certain showing.  
 
 4. Categories or Continuum? 
 Some antitrust commentators depict the relationship between per se and rule of 
reason analysis as “less a dichotomy than a continuum.”28  The Court has provided much 
ammunition for this position.29  The Court has gone so far as to assert that “properly 
understood, rule-of-reason analysis is not distinct from ‘per se’ analysis. On the contrary, 
agreements that are illegal per se are merely a species within the broad category of 
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade; less proof is required to establish their 
illegality, but they nonetheless violate the basic rule of reason.”30  Such statements show 
a fundamental misunderstanding of basic antitrust principles.  The per se rule and rule of 
reason analysis both attempt to define those agreements that fall in the category 
                                                
27   See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006).  Hovenkamp refers to the quick look 
approach as “an intermediate form of inquiry,” rather than a procedure for deciding which of the 
two traditional forms of inquiry to apply.  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: 
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 265 (3d ed. 2005). 
28 ABA RULE OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 10 (“Once we see that the rule of reason 
can sometimes be quickly applied . . . without refined fact-finding, it becomes apparent that 
reasonableness inquiries are not so totally different from the per se approach ... [and] that the two 
are less a dichotomy than a continuum.”) (quoting 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 3, ¶ 1508b, at 408);  
Cavanagh, supra note __ at 826. 
29 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (the methods are “best 
viewed as a continuum, on which the `amount and range of information needed’ to evaluate a 
restraint varies depending on how `highly suspicious’ and how `unique’ the restraint is.”); see 
also ABA RULE OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 9 (“Antitrust scholars and the more 
recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that, rather than being a dichotomy, the traditional per se 
standard and comprehensive rule of reason analysis are more accurately viewed as representing 
opposite ends of a single continuum of antitrust analysis measuring the reasonableness of the 
challenged conduct.”). 
30  U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 476 (1978). 
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“unreasonable.”  But each approach takes a different tack.  The per se rule is purely 
categorical: if a restraint falls in a per se class of contracts, the agreement is condemned 
outright.  As Timothy Muris observed before the Court decided California Dental, the 
Supreme Court created a dichotomy where “per se rules are not part of the rule of reason 
analysis, and have no relationship to the reasonableness of a practice.”31  Indeed, if “rule-
of-reason analysis [were] not distinct from ‘per se’ analysis,” as the Court asserts, 
hundreds of litigants would not be debating and dozens of federal judges would not be 
publicly agonizing over which mode of analysis to apply in each antitrust case.  
The development of quick look analysis muddles the strict dichotomous 
categories of per se and rule of reason analysis.  In California Dental, the first case in 
which the Court explicitly recognizes the existence of quick look analysis, the Justices 
attempt to bolster the commentators’ suggestion that antitrust employs a continuum by 
way of the breathy confessional: “The truth is that our categories of analysis of 
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of 
reason’ tend to make them appear.”32  Such language reinforces the notion that a 
continuum is in operation.33  After California Dental, the D.C. Circuit opined that the 
Supreme Court had “backed away from any reliance upon fixed categories and toward a 
continuum.”34 
                                                
31 Timothy  Muris, In Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (1998). 
32 California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999). 
33 See HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra note __ at 117 (“In its California Dental 
Association (CDA) decision the Supreme Court observed that there is no bright line between per 
se and rule of reason analysis, but rather a continuum.”). 
34 Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir.  2005) (“It would be somewhat misleading, 
however, to say the “quick look” is just a new category of analysis intermediate in complexity between “ 
per se ” condemnation and full-blown “rule of reason” treatment, for that would suggest the Court has 
moved from a dichotomy to a trichotomy, when in fact it has backed away from any reliance upon fixed 
categories and toward a continuum.”). 
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 The Court’s attempt to recharacterize its decades-old approach to antitrust 
analysis should not be understood as an abandonment of categorical decision-making, for 
several reasons.  First, the continuum explanation is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s 
earlier pronouncements, which it has declined to distinguish or disavow.  Before 
acknowledging in 1999 the presence of the quick look method to prove unreasonability, 
the Court described its approach as utilizing “two complementary categories of antitrust 
analysis. In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so 
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their 
illegality-they are ‘illegal per se.’ In the second category are agreements whose 
competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, 
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed [i.e., rule of reason 
analysis].”35  
There is no reasonable way to read this statement except as indicating that there 
are two distinct categories of antitrust analysis in section one cases: per se and rule of 
reason.  When the Court muddled the categorical analysis in NCAA and Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, lower courts rationalized the Court’s moves by divining the 
abbreviated rule of reason, or “quick look.”  But even after apparently blurring the 
distinction between per se and rule of reason, the Supreme Court subsequently steadfastly 
protected the per se categorical approach in FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers36 and 
Palmer v. B.R.G. of Georgia.37  Interpreting the Court’s quick look trajectory, the Federal 
Trade Commission reasoned that “[a]lthough there have been some oblique suggestions 
                                                
35 Professional Engineers, 435 U.S., at 692; see also F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (quoting National Society of Professional Engineers). 
36 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
37 498 U.S. 46 (1990). 
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in Supreme Court cases that perhaps the categories had merged, the Court later returned 
to distinguishing between per se and rule of reason categories … [T]hese separate 
categories continue to serve valid enforcement purposes and, in any event, authoritative 
Supreme Court decisions continue to recognize the distinction.”38 In short, even after 
disclaiming categorical analysis in favor of a flexible continuum, the Court itself 
continued to employ its per se-rule of reason structure in other cases.39   
Perhaps this explains why so many lower courts continue to treat these as 
categories of per se and rule of reason analysis as dichotomous.  Although some lower 
courts have suggested that the development of quick look analysis illustrates the move 
away from categories toward continua,40 even after recognition of the quick look, many 
courts continue to speak as though there are only two categories of antitrust analysis: per 
se and rule of reason.41  This is not surprising given that quick look is essentially a variant 
of rule of reason analysis, albeit abbreviated or truncated rule of reason. 
 
B. Characterizing restraints. 
 Whether an agreement falls within a per se category – and the level of scrutiny 
that it will receive under whatever form of rule of reason the court applies – will be a 
function of a series of other categorizations. Not surprisingly, parties fight vigorously to 
                                                
38 Matter of California Dental Association, 121 F.T.C. 190, 299 (1996). 
39 See also Barry J. Brett & Nancy C. Wallace, Sylvania and the Dual Distribution Dilemma, 26 
N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 972, 973 (1981) (“Justice Powell in Sylvania made a point of preserving 
both the per se rule of United States v. Topco Associates for horizontal restraints, as well as per 
se rules for vertical price restraints.”). 
40 Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
41 See, e.g., Flash Elec., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 379, 385 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Courts analyze the legality of such agreements using one of two frameworks: 
either the per se approach, or the “rule of reason.”“) (citations omitted). 
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have their conduct (or their adversary’s conduct) classed on one side or the other of the 
following lines. 
  
1. Horizontal versus Vertical 
 Antitrust law draws a fundamental distinction between so-called horizontal and 
vertical agreements.  Horizontal agreements are contracts or conspiracies among 
competitors, firms at the same level in the distribution chain who we would expect to 
compete against each other in a free market.  Vertical restraints are “those imposed by 
agreement between firms at different levels of distribution.”42   
 Determining whether the defendants in a section one case are in a horizontal or 
vertical relationship can be dispositive, because horizontal agreements are much more 
likely to be condemned as per se illegal while analogous vertical restraints are evaluated 
under the rule of reason.   First, with respect to price restraints, horizontal agreements to 
fix or stabilize prices have been per se illegal for decades.43  By contrast, antitrust’s 
treatment of vertical price restraints has evolved.  The Supreme Court initially 
condemned vertical price-fixing as per se illegal in 1911 in Dr. Miles.  This made 
agreements by a manufacturer to set the resale price of its products illegal as a matter of 
law.  The Court pared back Dr. Miles’ per se rule in 1997’s State Oil v. Khan, holding 
that vertical agreements to set a maximum resale price should be evaluated under the rule 
of reason.44  Then, in its most recent antitrust opinion, Leegin, the Court reversed Dr. 
                                                
42 Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S. at 730. 
43  Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 
U.S. 150 (1940); U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
44 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
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Miles outright, rendering all vertical price agreements subject to rule of reason analysis.45  
As a result, horizontal price restraints fall in the per se category and vertical ones do not.   
 Second, the legality of territorial restraints is a function of whether courts 
conceive the agreement to be horizontal or vertical in nature.  Territorial restraints exist 
when sellers are assigned exclusive territories in which competition has been limited in 
some form.   Horizontal market division, in which competitors allocate exclusive 
geographic markets to each other, is per se illegal.46  Following 1967’s Schwinn opinion, 
vertical territorial restraints were also condemned as illegal per se.47  But a decade later, 
the Court reversed course in Sylvania,48 holding that territorial restrictions imposed 
vertically are evaluated under the rule of reason.  As the Court explicitly reaffirmed the 
per se rule against similar horizontal restraints,49 Sylvania marked a turning point in 
section one jurisprudence and increased the stakes of the horizontal-vertical 
categorization considerably. 
 Third, courts often characterize concerted refusals to deal as either horizontal or 
vertical in nature in order to determine whether the group boycott warrants per se 
condemnation.  Those boycotts that “originate among the horizontal competitors” are 
                                                
45   Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). 
46 Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (horizontal agreement to divide 
geographic markets was “unlawful on its face”); U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 
(1972). 
47 U. S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
48 Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) 
49 433 U.S. at 58 n.28; see also Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); David E. 
Weisberg, Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania: Implications for Horizontal, as Well as Vertical, 
Restraints on Distributors, 33 BUS. LAWYER 1757, 1761 (1978) (“Thus, the Court takes pains to 
contrast the vertical nature of the restraints in Continental TV with the horizontal restraints in 
Topco.”). 
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more likely to be treated as per se illegal.50  In contrast, concerted refusals to deal deemed 
to be vertical receive full rule of reason analysis.51   
Finally, the distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints sometimes drives 
policy proposals in antitrust. For example, in the debate over the role of contribution in 
antitrust claims, some scholars argued that the availability of contribution should be a 
function of whether the challenged restraints was horizontal or vertical.52   
 
2. Naked versus Ancillary 
 Another distinction that courts sometimes employ in determining whether a 
challenged agreement goes in a per se category is whether the restraint is ancillary or 
naked.  Federal courts have reasoned that they “must distinguish between ‘naked’ 
restraints, those in which the restriction on competition is unaccompanied by new 
production or products, and ‘ancillary’ restraints, those that are part of a larger endeavor 
whose success they promote.”53  Naked restraints are essentially per se illegal.54  
Ancillary restraints are evaluated under the rule of reason and generally survive it.55  
                                                
50 See Flash Elec., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 379, 388 n.4 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
51 See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text (discussing the horizontal versus vertical 
debate in group boycott cases). 
52 Donald J. Polden & E. Thomas Sullivan, Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust 
Litigation: A Legislative Analysis, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 416 (1983) (“Moreover, vertical 
and horizontal arrangements should be distinguished, as they are in large part in standards of 
antitrust liability, because beneficial effects often accompany vertical nonprice restrictions, and 
the harshness of the no-contribution rule may unnecessarily inhibit otherwise procompetitive 
conduct.”). 
53 Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1985)). 
54 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAM NO. 23, THE RULE OF REASON (1999) (“In the 
case of certain agreements, principally those directly affecting price or output, the adverse effect 
on competition is readily apparent.  These agreements are variously termed ‘naked restraints,’ 
facially anticompetitive’ or ‘inherently suspect.’”). 
55  ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAM NO. 23, THE RULE OF REASON, 124 (1999) 
(“Ancillary restraints are judged under the rule of reason and are lawful if reasonably necessary 
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Some courts have suggested that “naked restrictions” that do “not clearly fit within a per 
se category” should receive quick look scrutiny,56 though it is unclear whether that quick 
look will lead to per se classification or to treatment as an intermediate third category.  
Regardless, for a restraint to be categorized as “naked” is a fair harbinger of impending 
condemnation.   
 
3. Voluntary Versus Coerced Restraints 
In some circumstances courts classify the legality of conduct on the basis of 
whether an agreement was made voluntarily or was coerced by a firm with market power. 
An example is the antitrust (and patent misuse) treatment of package licenses: agreements 
to purchase not just a single patent license but to license a block of patents together in a 
single package. In 1950, the Supreme Court held that the package licensing of hundreds 
of patents relating to radio technology was lawful, because licensees wanted the package 
so they could clear all the rights they needed to manufacture their products.57 By 1969, 
however, the Court held the same package license by the same patent holding company 
                                                                                                                                            
to achieve the success of a legitimate joint venture.”)(citations omitted); see also Polk Bros., Inc. 
v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The reason for distinguishing 
between ‘ancillary’ and ‘naked’ restraints is to determine whether the agreement is part of a 
cooperative venture with prospects for increasing output.  If it is, it should not be condemned per 
se.”); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(“To be ancillary, and hence exempt from the per se rule, an agreement must be subordinate and 
collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction.  The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral 
in the sense that it serves to make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its 
purpose.”).  See also SCFC, 36 F.3d at 970 (quoting Rothery); Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 (‘A 
restraint is ancillary when it may contribute to the success of a cooperative venture that promises 
greater productivity and output.’). 
56  See Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 514 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1999). 
57   Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950). 
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per se illegal because the defendants complained that they were forced to take licenses to 
patents they did not want or need.58 
 The Federal Circuit adopted this distinction between voluntary and coerced 
package licenses in Engel v. Lockformer.59  In Engel, the accused infringer had signed a 
licensing agreement with the patentee for use of the patented system for connecting sheet 
metal ducts together. The agreement called for calculation of royalties based in part on 
the number of “corner connectors” used by the licensee; these components were not 
covered by the patent. The court pointed out that this was a convenient way to calculate 
royalties, and noted that the licensee “voluntarily agreed to the royalties provisions,” and 
that the licensor had not “used its market power to shoehorn [the licensee] into license 
agreement that forced [it] to purchase unpatented items . . .”60 As a result, it found no 
coercion and hence no misuse. Had the licensee been coerced, however, the court 
suggested that the royalty provision might have been invalid.61 
 While in theory such a distinction might make sense, as a “tie” results only from a 
coercive connection,62 in practice it is likely to prove difficult if not impossible to 
distinguish voluntary from involuntary agreements.  Contract law has rightly shied away 
from inquiring into whether one party “wanted to” agree to a contractual provision in all 
but the most egregious cases.  It is enough to show that they did agree.  The Court’s 
distinction will likely encourage self-serving testimony by both parties long after the fact 
                                                
58   Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
59   96 F.3d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
60   96 F.3d at 1408. 
61   Accord American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959) (“The 
protection, or monopoly, which is given to the first patent stops where the monopoly of the 
second begins.  Whatever may be the asserted reason or justification of the patent owner, if he 
compels a licensee to accept a package of patents or none at all, he employs one patent as a lever 
to compel the acceptance of a license under another.  Equity will not countenance such a result.”). 
62   See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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of the agreement itself.  Further, it will encourage strategic behavior by licensors, who 
may be expected to include “voluntariness” clauses in future contracts.63   
 Interestingly, in its most recent treatment of the package licensing issue, the 
Federal Circuit eschewed any discussion of the voluntariness of the license, and indeed 
rejected application of the per se rule altogether.  In Philips Corp. v. International Trade 
Comm’n,64 the court rejected the “hornbook law” that mandatory package licensing was 
patent misuse as “not supported by precedent or reason.” Philips makes no effort to 
distinguish Zenith or Engel even though it seems flatly to reject their voluntariness 
analysis.  Despite this omission, and the resulting conflict in Federal Circuit caselaw, 
there is some reason to believe Philips signals an inclination on the court to replace the 
unworkable voluntariness standard with a more economically reasonable alternative. 
Something similar occurs in copyright law. The practice of “block booking” – 
requiring a TV station or movie theater to take a package of shows to exhibit – is illegal 
per se.65  By contrast, it is perfectly legal to enter into voluntary agreements to license not 
just one but many shows. This distinction is problematic for the same reasons as the 
patent distinction, but like the patent distinction, it seems to drive the outcome. 
                                                
63   In Leesona Corp. v. Varta Batteries, 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court set 
some standards for determining whether such an agreement is in fact coerced.  The court looked 
“to see whether the license condition was the result of good faith bargaining between the parties 
or was imposed on the licensee by the patent holder and whether the licensee raised objections 
that were overridden by the licensor.” 
64   424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
65   See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)While the per se rule against block 
booking is old, and arguably dates from a prior era of hostility to IP licensing that no longer 
exists, modern courts have reaffirmed the per se rule.  See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Public 
Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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In these cases, courts have created sharp categories – voluntary and coerced 
package licenses – that they use to divide cases between per se illegality and the rule of 
reason.  
 
4.  Unilateral versus Concerted Restraints  
Perhaps the most fundamental distinction in antitrust law is between unilateral 
and concerted restraints. This distinction is one of the few that has a statutory basis; 
section 1 of the Sherman Act governs only “contracts, combinations or conspiracies” in 
restraint of trade, while unilateral actions are given more favorable treatment under 
section 2. This distinction is significantly, though not perfectly, correlated with the line 
between the rule of reason and per se illegality: claims involving unilateral restraints are 
almost all evaluated under a rule of reason-type approach where the courts weighs the 
anti- and pro-competitive effects of the challenged conduct, while many (though by no 
means all) concerted acts are illegal per se. 
 
 5. Obsolete Categories 
  a. Price versus Nonprice 
 Until recently, section one jurisprudence maintained a critical distinction between 
price and non-price restraints for many types of conduct.  As noted, Dr. Miles condemned 
vertical price restraints as per se illegal.  When Sylvania removed vertical non-price 
restraints from the per se category, this meant that vertical price and non-price restraints 
received fundamentally different treatment.66  Plaintiffs sought to characterize the 
                                                
66 See Barry J. Brett & Nancy C. Wallace, Sylvania and the Dual Distribution Dilemma, 26 N. Y. 
L. SCH. L. REV. 972, 973 (1981) (“Justice Powell in Sylvania made a point of preserving both the 
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defendants’ agreement as price-related and defendants scrambled to present their 
restraints as non-price in nature.67  In its June 2007 Leegin opinion, a five-member 
majority of the Court asserted that there was “little economic justification for the current 
differential treatment of vertical price and nonprice restraints.”68 With Leegin’s reversal 
of Dr. Miles, courts will analyze all vertical restraints under the rule of reason. The price-
non-price categorization process should cease, at least for vertical restraints. 
 
   b. Maximum versus Minimum Pricing 
In the context of horizontal price agreements, courts make no distinction based on 
whether the prices set are characterized as minimum or maximum prices.  The minimum-
maximum distinction once had resonance in vertical price-fixing cases.  While the 
Court’s first opinion treating resale price maintenance as per se illegal involved the fixing 
of minimum prices,69 the Court later expanded this to a prohibition on maximum resale 
price maintenance as well.70  The Court then backtracked, holding that vertical maximum 
price fixing should be evaluated under rule of reason.71 This made the distinction between 
vertically-set minimum and maximum prices critical – the latter fell in a per se category 
and the former did not.  However, this categorical distinction was to last but a decade, as 
the recent Leegin decision brought minimum resale price maintenance within the rule of 
                                                                                                                                            
per se rule of United States v. Topco Associates for horizontal restraints, as well as per se rules 
for vertical price restraints.”). 
67 HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra note xx at 191 (“Lawyer and judicial 
resources are wasted in disputes about whether a particular restraint falls into the “price” or 
“nonprice” category. But this dispute has taken center stage in vertical restraints cases because 
price restraints are unlawful per se, while virtually all nonprice restraints are legal.”). 
68  Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). 
69 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) 
70 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968). 
71 State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 
152-54 (1968)). 
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reason.72  While Leegin renders the maximum-minimum categorization process irrelevant 
today, this evolution reinforces the critical distinction between horizontal and vertical 
restraints.  Horizontal maximum price-fixing is per se illegal, while vertical maximum 
price-fixing is evaluated under the rule of reason and essentially legal. 
 
II. Problems with Reliance on Categorical Analysis. 
As long as antitrust maintains differential rules, litigants will debate 
categorization and companies will try to conform their conduct to the more lenient box.  
While some of this discussion may help inform the antitrust analysis, courts and 
practitioners have often gone overboard. In many cases, courts spend more time 
determining the category than analyzing the effects of the restraint.  This section 
highlights several of the current problems with categorical analysis in antitrust 
jurisprudence. 
 
 A. Shifting Categories 
One of the problems with categorical analysis is that the boundaries of categories 
shift without logic or warning.  The Supreme Court recently asserted in Leegin, “the 
boundaries of the doctrine of per se illegality should not be immovable.”73  This is true, 
but as scholars noted even before the development of quick look, “the line between 
application of the per se rule and the rule of reason has become blurred to the point that 
these analytical tools are often indecipherable.”74 The evolution of quick look analysis 
has made matters worse, as confusion over whether a challenged restraint falls within the 
                                                
72 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).   
73 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2720-21 (2007).    
74 ABA RULE OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 10.   
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“quick look” or requires “full-blown rule of reason analysis” introduces significant 
uncertainty into antitrust litigation.75    
The categorical analysis practiced by the Supreme Court is premised on shifting, 
ill-defined boxes.  This makes antitrust analysis unprincipled and unpredictable.  This 
section reviews antitrust categories that appeared stable and then shifted, leaving in their 
wake categories of restraints that are nominally per se but, in reality, much more 
complicated.  
 
  1. Price-Fixing 
Horizontal price-fixing represents the epitome of per se illegal conduct.  It is the 
oldest and least controversial per se category.  But the contours of what constitutes price-
fixing have expanded and contracted in a manner that reduces precision and 
predictability.  The Court early on signaled an unwillingness to consider as a defense an 
argument by cartels that they had set a reasonable price.76   In its first use of the “per se” 
terminology, the Court in Socony-Vacuum held that “a combination formed for the 
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price 
of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”77  The concept of 
price-fixing expanded to include agreements among competitors to eliminate discounts 
and the extension of credit78 as well as agreements to set maximum prices.79  Even as the 
category of per se illegal horizontal price-fixing grew, the concept remained relatively 
                                                
75 Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F.Supp.2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
76 See U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); but see Appalachian Coals v. U.S., 288 
U.S. 344 (1933). 
77 U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) 
78 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). 
79 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
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clear: antitrust law condemns cartel arrangements in which competitors set price 
collectively rather than letting competition determine price and output.   
 That clarity blurred with 1979’s BMI decision.80  In BMI, the Court considered the 
legality of blanket licenses in which performing rights societies aggregated the 
copyrighted works of thousands of composers and licensed the works to television 
stations for one fee.  The blanket licenses fixed prices.  They also reduced transactions 
costs considerably, essentially creating a new product, which was apparently desired by 
most TV stations.  Instead of saying that the blanket licenses did not represent a cartel 
arrangement in form or function, the Court opined that “[a]s generally used in the 
antitrust field, ‘price fixing’ is a shorthand way of describing certain categories of 
business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable…. Thus, it is 
necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling within or without that 
category of behavior to which we apply the label ‘per se price fixing.’”81  The language 
of BMI suggests that the per se rule had ceased to be an analytical approach and had 
instead become a legal conclusion based on some sort of functional market analysis.  
After BMI, price-fixing is a less clear category.  The Court’s language had the 
unfortunate effect of muddling the category, with the Court essentially saying that “fixing 
prices is not price fixing.”  While the Court was correct to conclude that blanket licensing 
should not, in and of itself, fall in the per se category, the Court did little to define the 
contours of this – the most critical – per se category and explain why blanket licensing 
was different.  As a result, the per se rule lost some vital predictability.  
                                                
80 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
81 Id. at 9.  
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 The Court blurred the contours of the per se illegal price-fixing category further in 
its Dagher opinion.  In Dagher, the plaintiffs challenged the legality of joint venture 
members’ setting a price for their respective branded gasoline products.  The Court held 
that the agreement was not per se illegal because it took place in the context of a 
“legitimate joint venture” – one that had been approved by the FTC and the relevant 
agencies of four states – in which the former competitors cooperated.82  The Court 
reasoned that “[a]s a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the 
discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the discretion to 
sell a product under two different brands at a single, unified price.”83  But the Court’s 
reasoning hinges on the characterization of Equilon “as a single entity.”  If Equilon is to 
be treated as a single entity, then any debate about the per se rule versus rule of reason 
analysis is completely superfluous – a single entity cannot violate section one as a matter 
of law, because section one requires an agreement between separate entities, and 
unilateral conduct under section two is never subject to per se condemnation.   Justice 
Thomas’ confusion on basic antitrust principles leaves it unclear what the Court is doing 
with the per se rule in this case.   
The parameters of the per se category are also distorted by the Court’s utter 
failure to define what it means by “legitimate joint venture,” which is the entire basis for 
excluding the oil companies’ agreement from per se condemnation.  When is a joint 
venture “legitimate” such that it falls outside of the per se category?  The Court gives no 
criteria; indeed, it “presume[s] for purposes of these cases that Equilon is a lawful joint 
                                                
82 Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006) (“[T]he pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture 
do not fall within the narrow category of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act…”). 
83 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
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venture.”84   But if legality turns on the defendant being a “legitimate joint venture,” then 
Justice Thomas simply presumed the defendant’s agreement did not violate the Sherman 
Act.  Justice Thomas quotes BMI for the proposition that “[j]oint ventures and other 
cooperative arrangements are ... not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing 
schemes, where the agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all.”85  But 
in BMI, cooperation was needed to create the new product, a blanket license.  In Dagher, 
there is no hint in the Court’s opinion that this joint venture was necessary to create 
gasoline, hardly a new product. 
 The Court’s treatment of the per se and rule of reason analyses as separate legal 
theories creates further problems.  The Court concludes that Equilon’s price-fixing cannot 
be condemned as per se illegal and it chastises the plaintiff, admonishing them that they 
“should have challenged [Equilon's price unification policy] pursuant to the rule of 
reason.”86 However, it precluded them from arguing that the restraint violated section one 
under rule of reason analysis because they did “not put forth a rule of reason claim.”87  
On remand, the Ninth Circuit was compelled to affirm the district court’s summary 
judgment against the plaintiffs, who were never allowed to make a rule of reason 
argument.88  The Court’s reasoning is seriously flawed.  The per se rule and rule of 
reason are modes of analysis, not separate causes of action.  Just because one mode of 
analysis may not be appropriate does not preclude condemnation under another test.  The 
                                                
84 Dagher, 547 U.S. at __ 
85 Dagher, 547 U.S. at __ (quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979)). 
86 Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
87  Dagher, 547 U.S. at __. 
88 Dagher v. Saudi Refining Inc., 466 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment 
against plaintiffs). 
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cause of action (an unreasonable restraint of trade) and the remedy (trebled damages and 
appropriate injunction relief) are exactly the same. 
 The Court’s approach creates perverse and inefficient incentives.  Following BMI 
and Dagher, plaintiffs may be less certain whether conduct that appears to be per se 
illegal will be held so by courts.  It is hard to guess correctly; after all, the Ninth Circuit 
had held that Texaco and Shell Oil’s pricing conduct in Dagher was per se illegal.89 
Thus, in the wake of Dagher, savvy plaintiffs will not rely solely on per se arguments.  
Rather, they will develop cases under both per se and rule of reason theories.  But if a 
plaintiff has to argue both per se and rule of reason from the start in order to prevent the 
court from changing the mode of analysis and refusing to allow the plaintiff leave to 
pursue a formerly per se case under a rule of reason analysis, then every plaintiff will 
have to go to the expense of pleading and developing a rule of reason case.90  This 
undermines the efficiency purpose of the per se rule.  
 
  2. Group Boycotts 
Initially, the Supreme Court declared group boycotts to be per se illegal.  In 
Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,91 Klor’s, a San Francisco department store, 
sued its down-the-street rival for convincing several manufacturers of consumer 
electronics and other household appliances to join a conspiracy to cease supplying Klor’s 
with their products.  Without using the precise words “per se illegality,” the Court 
nonetheless articulated a per se rule against such concerted action: “Group boycotts, or 
                                                
89 Dagher, 547 U.S. at (citing Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1116 (2004)) 
90 While this occurred before Dagher to some degree, the Court’s approach in Dagher can only exacerbate 
the problem. 
91  359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
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concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the 
forbidden category.  They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable 
in the specific circumstances…”92  That is the essence of per se illegality: the conduct 
falls in a “forbidden category” so courts denounce it without considering the 
reasonableness of the specific restraint at issues because it is condemned categorically.  
Lower courts interpreted Klor’s as putting group boycotts in the per se category.93   
 The Court later began to erode the contours of the per se category for group 
boycotts.  In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing 
Co.,94 a case involving a member firm’s expulsion from a buyers’ cooperative, the Court 
cast doubt on this per se categorization.  First, after noting that “‘[g]roup boycotts’ are 
often listed among the classes of economic activity that merit per se invalidation under § 
1,” the Court hedged by saying, “Exactly what types of activity fall within the forbidden 
category is, however, far from certain.”95 The Court even quoted Lawrence Sullivan’s 
famous observance that “there is more confusion about the scope and operation of the per 
se rule against group boycotts than in reference to any other aspect of the per se 
doctrine,”96 apparently without appreciating that it was the source of the confusion.   
 Second, the Court attempted to define the boundaries of the per se category for 
group boycotts.  As the Ninth Circuit aptly summarized, “Northwest Wholesale identified 
three characteristics as indicative of per se illegal boycotts: (1) the boycott cuts off access 
to a supply, facility, or market necessary to enable the victim firm to compete; (2) the 
                                                
92 Id. at 212.   
93 Walker Distributing Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1963) (“Group 
boycotts are just as illegal under the Sherman Act as group price fixing.”)  (citing Klor's, Inc. v. 
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)). 
94 472 U.S. 284 (1985) 
95 472 U.S. at 293-94.  
96 Id. (quoting Lawrence Sullivan, Law of Antitrust 229-230 (1977).) 
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boycotting firm possesses a dominant market position; and (3) the practices are not 
justified by plausible arguments that they enhanced overall efficiency or competition.”97  
Defining the parameters of the per se category in this fashion is peculiar because market 
power and efficiency justifications are the hallmarks of rule of reason analysis.  Under 
this legal test for group boycotts, courts must apply the rule of reason in order to 
determine whether the per se rule applies.  In short, this approach ceases to be per se98 if 
group boycotts are subject to per se condemnation only after courts have performed a 
modified rule of reason inquiry.  
Accordingly, it might be tempting to conclude that group boycotts are analyzed 
under the rule of reason, despite the Court’s imposition of a per se label.  This would not 
be unprecedented.  For example, the Court continues to refer to tying arrangements as per 
se illegal despite the fact that tie-ins are not subject to categorical condemnation and 
receive treatment that is, in reality, a structured rule of reason analysis.99 
Yet courts still do sometimes condemn group boycotts without elaborate inquiry 
and without permitting the defendants to proffer any defense and without marching 
through the Northwest Wholesale factors.100  For example, in Federal Trade Commission 
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,101 in which trial lawyers boycotted working 
as court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants unless the D.C. government increased 
                                                
97 Hahn v. Oregon Physicians’ Serv., 868 F.2d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 1988). 
98   Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, The Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions for 
Anticompetitive Litigation, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 757, 774 (1992) (“A per se rule that applies only 
when a defendant has market power and cannot show procompetitive effects is no per se rule at 
all.”). 
99 See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text.  
100   For an example of a decision that applied Northwest Wholesale and still found the per se rule 
to govern, see Consumers Warehouse Center, Inc. v. Intercounty Appliance Corp., __ F. Supp. 2d 
__, 2007 WL 922423 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007). 
101 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
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compensation, the Supreme Court condemned the defendants’ boycott as per se illegal 
without even mentioning Northwest Wholesale.  In the main text of its opinion, the Court 
fails to provide any meaningful guidance as how to distinguish between per se illegal 
group boycotts and those analyzed under the rule of reason.  This has led to great 
confusion for lower federal courts.102  However, the Court does attempt to justify its per 
se label in a footnote where, in response to Justice Brennan’s dissent, the majority 
“emphasize[s] that this case involves not only a boycott but also a horizontal price-fixing 
arrangement-a type of conspiracy that has been consistently analyzed as a per se violation 
for many decades.”103  This highlights yet another problem with categorization: the 
Supreme Court’s characterization of the lawyers’ agreement as a boycott seems odd.  The 
agreement seems more akin to horizontal price-fixing, which the Court seems to 
acknowledge in its footnote.  If this justifies the per se condemnation, why categorized 
the conduct as a group boycott in the first place? 
 
 Group boycotts remain subject to categorical condemnation, but the category’s 
parameters are imprecise.  Group boycotts are per se illegal, but the Court declines to 
define what it means by the term.104 Even when the challenged conduct is a boycott, the 
Court in a classic understatement has opined that refusals to deal “are not a unitary 
                                                
102 See, e.g., Flash Elec., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 379, 387 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The Second Circuit has echoed that caution, while noting that “[t]he scope of 
the per se rule against group boycotts is a recognized source of confusion in antitrust law.”) 
(citing Bogan, 166 F.3d at 515.). 
103 Id. at n.19. 
104 See F.T.C. v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (“Although this Court 
has in the past stated that group boycotts are unlawful per se, we decline to resolve this case by 
forcing the Federation's policy into the “boycott” pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule.”). 
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phenomenon.”105  Yet if group boycotts are not unitary, it seems inappropriate for the 
Court to treat them as a category of per se illegal restraint.  Ultimately, boycott litigation 
can devolve into debates about categorization instead of an analysis of anticompetitive 
effects.  
 
  3. Information Exchanges 
 Antitrust law is understandably nervous whenever competitors get together in a 
room and exchange information. Information exchange, especially information about 
prices and output, can facilitate the formation of a cartel and also help cartelists detect 
and prevent cheating. At the same time, trade associations can also serve valuable 
procompetitive (or at least competitively neutral) purposes.106  
 Antitrust law has tried to accommodate these competing concerns by drawing 
rough lines between exchanges of price information, which they often treat as illegal per 
se, and exchanges of other forms of information, which are subject to the rule of 
reason.107 Taken in the abstract, this category approach makes some sense, because it 
targets the per se rule at the category of cases that seems most likely to cause competitive 
harm. 
 The problem is that the value of information exchanges has changed over time. 
An example involves standard-setting organizations (SSOs), which were virtually 
unknown in the 1920s when the information exchange rules were created, but which are 
                                                
105   St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978). 
106   See, e.g., David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Cooperation, and Antitrust, 62 Antitrust L.J. 
465 (1994). 
107   Compare Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) with Eastern 
States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914) (exchange of 
information supporting a boycott of competitors at trade association meeting violated section 1); 
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). 
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now ubiquitous in the information technology industries.  SSOs serve valuable 
procompetitive purposes, particularly in network industries where products must work 
together.108  Further, the experience of SSOs with intellectual property (IP) rights 
suggests that organizations will often need to discuss and even agree on the price at 
which patent owners will license rights covering the standard, or else they will be 
adopting standards without any idea of whether they will be infringing a patent and thus 
without knowing the total cost of that standard.109 The head of the FTC has recently 
recognized the need for price information exchange in SSOs, suggesting that that 
particular form of price information should be subject to the rule of reason rather than the 
per se rule.110 We think the FTC’s approach makes sense, and that SSOs should be able to 
exchange price information about IP licenses without facing per se liability.111 The 
category distinction between price and non-price information exchange made sense when 
it was developed, but it did not consider the complexities of modern technology or the 
specific context of patents covering standards. The proper rule in the modern world 
shouldn’t draw the sharp distinction that made sense in the 1920s. 
 
                                                
108   See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 
90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization 
Problem, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1041 (1996). 
109   For a discussion, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of 
Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. Rev. 149 (2007). 
110   Deborah Platt Majoras, Recognizing the Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in 
Standard Setting, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf (September 23, 
2005). 
111   Cases are split on this question right now.  See, e.g., Addamax Corp. v. Open Software 
Found., 888 F. Supp. 274, 281, 284-85 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(finding that an antitrust challenge to an SSO could proceed to trial under the rule of reason, but 
ultimately finding no liability); Sony Elec. v. Soundview Tech., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180, 183 (D. 
Conn. 2001); cf. In re American Soc’y of Sanitary Eng’g, 106 F.T.C. 324, 329 (1985) (consent 
decree forbidding SSO from rejecting proposed standards solely because they were patented). For 
a discussion of these cases, see 2 Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust § 35.6c. 
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 B. Categories Subject to Manipulation. 
Categories may make antitrust analysis more step-wise and orderly, but at a 
significant price.  Even categories that seem fixed in antitrust law may change from case 
to case because they are subject to manipulation by plaintiffs who want to put conduct in 
a forbidden box and defendants who want it in a box that receives more lenient treatment. 
 
  1. Horizontal versus Vertical 
 The purpose of distinguishing horizontal and vertical restraints is judicial 
efficiency.  If a restraint is horizontal, then courts are more likely to condemn it under the 
per se rule.  This saves time and resources because such horizontal restraints are likely or 
almost always likely to reduce competition in a manner that antitrust cares about, while 
vertical restraints often serve legitimate business purposes.  However, given the 
consequences of a restraint being labeled horizontal, the focus of antitrust litigation often 
shifts away from whether or not the restraint is unreasonable to whether the restraint is 
properly categorized as horizontal.  This section examines antitrust scenarios in which the 
amount of time and energy invested in debating what label to apply to the defendants 
would have been better spent determining the actual competitive effects of the restraint at 
issue. 
 
   a. Cooperatives 
 One example of unnecessary debate over whether conduct is appropriately 
characterized as vertical or horizontal involves the restraints imposed by cooperative 
associations and joint ventures.  The process of categorizing relationships among 
Categorical Analysis in Antitrust   Lemley/Leslie DRAFT 
  35 
members of a cooperative association began in earnest with 1967’s Sealy decision.112  
Sealy involved a joint venture that licensed mattress manufacturers to make and sell 
mattresses and other bedding products under the Sealy trademark.  Each of the 
approximately 30 licensees was allotted an exclusive territory.113  The government 
brought an action against Sealy, challenging its licensing scheme as a “conspir[acy] to 
allocate mutually exclusive territory among its manufacturers.”114   
To determine whether this allocation of exclusive territories violated section one 
of the Sherman, the Court felt it necessary to first categorize the restraint as either 
horizontal or vertical.  When the Sealy case was briefed and argued, White Motor was the 
governing law at the time and held that that vertical territorial restraints were entitled to 
rule of reason treatment.  Citing White Motor, Justice Fortas began the Sealy opinion by 
noting that “this Court has distinguished between horizontal and vertical territorial 
limitations.  For purposes of the impact of the Sherman Act, it is first necessary to 
determine whether the territorial arrangements here are to be treated as the creature of the 
licensor, Sealy, or as the product of a horizontal arrangement among the licensees.”115  
The Court proceeded to analyze the relationship among the licensees, which owned 
“substantially all” of Sealy’s stock, and concluded that the “territorial arrangements must 
                                                
112 United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
113 388 U.S. at __(“Sealy agreed with each licensee not to license any other person to manufacture 
or sell in the designated area; and the licensee agreed not to manufacture or sell ‘Sealy products' 
outside the designated area.”). 
114 388 U.S. at __.  
115 388 U.S. at __ (White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)). 
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be regarded as the creature of horizontal action by the licensees.”116  Justice Harlan, in his 
dissent, argued strenuously that the restraint was properly categorized as vertical.117 
The Court’s categorization process seems peculiar for two reasons.  First, one of 
the great ironies of Sealy is the timing of the decision.  Sealy relied on White Motor to 
show the importance of categorization.  Yet the same day it decided Sealy, the Court 
delivered its opinion in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,118 which overruled 
White Motor and held vertical non-price restraints represented a new category of per se 
illegal agreements.  Thus, as of June 12, 1967, both horizontal non-price restraints and 
vertical non-price restraints were per se illegal.  If ever there were an unnecessary debate 
over categorization, this was it.  The Supreme Court decided Sealy without 
acknowledging that Schwinn reversed White Motor and brought vertical non-price 
restraints within the per se rule.  Indeed, the majority opinion never even mentions 
Schwinn.  
Second, even ignoring Schwinn’s impending reversal of White Motor, it is unclear 
how this categorization step aided the Court’s ultimate decision to condemn the territorial 
restraints.  The Court condemned Sealy’s non-price restraints in large part because they 
were implemented in “connection with [] unlawful price-fixing.”119  Given this larger – 
and, if proven, clearly per se illegal – conduct, the Court invested effort in categorizing 
                                                
116 388 U.S. at __.  
117 United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 358 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that 
on this record the restrictive territorial arrangements here challenged are properly to be classified 
as ‘horizontal,’ and hence illegal per se under established antitrust doctrine. I believe that they 
should be regarded as ‘vertical’ and thus, as the Court recognizes, subject to different antitrust 
evaluation.”) 
118  388 U.S. 365 (1967).  Schwinn itself was overruled a decade later in Sylvania. 
119 388 U.S. at __ (Sealy did not appeal the district court’s injunction of its vertical price-fixing). 
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the restraint as horizontal even though it indicates it would have condemned the restraint 
regardless.120  In sum, much unnecessary effort is invested in needless categorization.   
 Sealy set the stage for the upcoming showdown between horizontal and vertical 
non-price restraints reflected in the Supreme Court’s opinions in Topco121 and 
Sylvania.122  First, in Topco, a group of smaller and medium-sized regional stores created 
a new line of branded products in order to compete against national store brands.  The 
cooperative sought to prevent free-riding by allocating de facto exclusive territories to the 
member stores.  Because it viewed the relationship among the stores as horizontal, the 
Supreme Court condemned the territorial restraint as per se illegal.  The Court rejected 
the argument that intrabrand competition could be sacrificed to increase interbrand 
competition.123 
 Then, in Sylvania, the Supreme Court seemingly reversed course and held that a 
manufacturer could impose territorial restraints in an effort to limit free-riding even 
though the restraint would lessen intrabrand competition in an effort to increase 
interbrand competition.  The precise argument that the Court forbade in Topco, it 
endorsed in Sylvania.   While this may seem like a reasonable evolution in antitrust 
doctrine, the Court did not actually reverse Topco; instead, it reaffirmed Topco while 
limiting its per se rule to horizontal restraints.  The Sylvania Court predicted that “[t]here 
may be occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal 
                                                
120 388 U.S. at __ (“For here, the arrangements for territorial limitations are part of ‘an 
aggregation of trade restraints' including unlawful price-fixing and policing. Within settled 
doctrine, they are unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act without the necessity for an inquiry in 
each particular case as to their business or economic justification, their impact in the marketplace, 
or their reasonableness.”) 
121 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
122 Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
123 405 U.S. at 612. 
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restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers. There is no doubt that 
restrictions in the latter category would be illegal per se…”124  The Court distinguished 
Sylvania because the agreement there was vertical in nature.  
In the aftermath of Topco and Sylvania, how courts conceive of the relationship 
will determine liability for cooperatives.  Categorization becomes dispositive.  Any given 
restraint has the same competitive effects regardless of how courts categorize it. Yet, if it 
is characterized as vertical, it will probably survive a rule of reason analysis; conversely, 
if it is characterized as horizontal, it will be condemned as per se illegal.  This means that 
litigants and judges focus on the characterization of a challenged restraint as either 
horizontal or vertical, instead of on the actual or predicted anticompetitive effects.   
 We don’t mean to suggest that there is nothing to the horizontal-vertical 
distinction.  For example, horizontal cooperative branding activity may be more likely to 
be used as a cover for a cartel among preexisting market participants.  But the Court has 
turned an occasional difference in how the rule of reason would treat two otherwise-
similar restraints into a bright-line rule that makes the differences between those 
restraints the critical inquiry. 
 
   b. Dual Distribution 
 The horizontal versus vertical debate also pervades antitrust litigation involving 
dual distributors.  Dual distribution exists when a manufacturer uses independent firms to 
distribute its product to some customers, while supplying other customers directly.  A 
manufacturer may pursue a dual distribution strategy for several reasons.  A manufacturer 
may have the capacity to distribute some but not all of its product.  It may “desire to 
                                                
124 Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977) (citing Topco). 
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protect its reputation, by preventing distributors from engaging in opportunistic behavior.  
Dual distribution also permits manufacturers to more easily monitor their distribution 
systems and to provide competitive stimulus to independent distributors.”125  While there 
are strong efficiency arguments for dual distribution, some observers fear that such 
scheme can be used “to facilitate price squeezes on independent dealers and to implement 
price discrimination.”126 
 Dual distribution does not in and of itself violate antitrust law.127 It would be 
absurd for antitrust law to command that a manufacturer who uses independent vendors 
to supply some of its customers must use independent vendors to supply all of its 
customers.  Nevertheless, dual distribution systems can raise antitrust concerns when the 
manufacturer possesses market power and employs the dual distribution framework to 
squelch competition in the downstream market.128 When a dual distributor imposes non-
price restraints, such as assigning exclusive territories, this creates an issue over how to 
characterize the restraint.   
While the traditional manufacturer-distributor relationship is clearly vertical, once 
the manufacturer enters the same level of the supply chain as its distributors, their 
relationship contains a horizontal element.  As a result, “the same territorial or customer 
                                                
125 Robert Zwirb, Dual Distribution and Antitrust Law, 21 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1273, 1274 n.2. 
(1988) 
126 Id. (citing Schwartz & Eisenstadt, Vertical Restraints, U.S. Dept. of Justice Antitrust Div., 
Econ. Policy Office Discussion Paper, at 65-71 (Dec. 2, 1982)). 
127  See Dart Industries v. Plunkett Co., 704 F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1983) (“selling directly to 
certain large accounts reflects a dual distribution system that standing alone, is perfectly 
lawful.”); In Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 355 F. Supp. 842, 864 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (“We have no doubt 
that there is nothing inherently evil in a dual distribution system whereby a manufacturer may sell 
its own products to the customers directly through company outlets along side  sic independent 
dealers.”). 
128 See Rea, 355 F. Supp. at 867 (“Whether dual distribution is or is not illegal or evil in and of 
itself, it does become an antitrust problem in the context of its use by a company possessing 
substantial market power.”) 
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restrictions that were previously viewed as vertical may be reclassified as market 
allocations among competitors, or horizontal restraints of trade…”129 
 Some courts addressing the legality of dual distribution under antitrust laws have 
focused on categorizing the restraints as horizontal or vertical, instead of any 
anticompetitive effects of the challenged restraints.130  This is the natural result of 
Sylvania, which brought vertical non-price restraints within the rule of reason, while 
maintaining per se illegality for horizontal non-price restraints:  
Sylvania, in effect, requires courts in dual distribution cases to characterize the 
restrictions at issue as either vertical or horizontal.  At the same time, Sylvania 
emphasizes that the determination of legality of distributional restraints ‘must be 
based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line 
drawing.’ While Sylvania requires courts to rely upon economic analysis in 
deciding distribution issues, its distinction between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
restraints forces courts to engage in the very 'formalistic line drawing' it purports 
to be eschewing.131 
Once the categorization becomes dispositive, litigants and judges spend their debating the 
category, not the economic effects of the challenged restraint.132 
                                                
129 Zwirb, supra note xx at 1276 (citing Altschuler, Sylvania, Vertical Restraints, and Dual 
Distribution, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 2 (1980); Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine 
and Economics in the section one Labyrinth: Is Sylvania A Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REV. 1457, 
1509-15 (1981); Liebeler, Intrabrand 'Cartels' Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1, 49-50 
(1982)). 
130 See Brett & Wallace supra note xx at 1000. 
131 Zwirb, supra note xx at 1284 (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59). 
132 See Zwirb, supra note xx at 1298 (“in cases decided after Sylvania, the legality of [dual 
distribution] restraints turned upon a determination of whether they were ‘vertical’ or 
‘horizontal.’”); id at 1319 (“By concentrating on the form of the distribution arrangement 
involved, most decisions fail to evaluate distribution restraints on the basis of economic effect.”). 
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 The vertical-horizontal characterization remains unsettled as scholars debate 
whether dual distributorships are horizontal or vertical.133  Most courts conclude that dual 
distribution schemes are essentially vertical.134 However, some courts, albeit a minority 
of them, have treated dual distribution systems as horizontal and, consequently, per se 
illegal.135  And “[a] number of lower courts have held . . . that the presence of dual 
distribution transforms intrabrand restrictions otherwise vertical in origin into horizontal 
ones.”136   
 Courts routinely engage in a laborious process of categorizing the dual 
distribution schemes as either horizontal or vertical.  Some judges focus on the source of 
the particular restraint within a dual distribution network,137 asking whether the 
manufacturer-defendant “was acting as a supplier (in a vertical capacity) or as a 
competitor distributor (in a horizontal capacity) when it allegedly [imposed a] 
                                                
133 Zwirb, supra note xx at 1286 (discussing Schwartz & Eisenstadt, at 73-74). 
134 See, e.g., Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 13 F.3d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1993); Tunis 
Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482 (3d Cir. 1985); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1984); Graphic Prods. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th 
Cir. 1983); Dart Indus. v. Plunkett Co. of Okla., 704 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1983); Davis-Watkins 
Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream 
Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15 
(4th Cir. 1981); Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981); Red 
Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1981); Abadir & Co. v. 
First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981)); H&B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 
577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72 (3d 
Cir. 1977). 
135 See, e.g., Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954  (5th Cir. 1978), appeal dismissed 
per stipulation, 591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. J. 
Sosnick & Son, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87, 91 (1980) (“It is settled that distributors cannot lawfully agree 
to divide territories or customers.”);Casey, supra note xx at 438-439 (citing Pitchford v. PEPI, 
Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), rem'd as to damages, 435 F. 
Supp. 685 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 
(1979); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978)); see also Brett 
& Wallace supra note xx at 992 (“Despite the fact that in none of the Pitchford opinions was it 
explicitly so stated, one is left with the conclusion that, at least in the Third Circuit, dual 
distribution restraints are illegal per se.”). 
136 Krehl, 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 78,704. 
137 See, e.g., Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1002-04 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, 16-17 (1981). 
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territory[ial] restraint.”138  Because a dual distribution scheme contains both horizontal 
and vertical aspects, courts then invest their energies into determining which of these 
aspects “predominates.”139  Courts then use the source of a particular restraint to 
determine which aspect predominates, reasoning that “[c]onspiracies between a 
manufacturer and its distributors are only treated as horizontal, however, when the source 
of the conspiracy is a combination of the distributors. [But when] … the asserted 
originator of the plan [is] the manufacturer, … antitrust law treats the conspiracy as a 
vertical restraint, and those restrictions are now judged under the rule of reason.”140   
Under this approach, the source of the restraint can be outcome determinative: “If 
the restriction originates from the manufacturer, the arrangement is deemed vertical and 
subject to the rule of reason.  But if it is initiated by dealers or distributors acting in 
concert with themselves or with the manufacturer, a horizontal conspiracy or cartel is 
presumed, and the arrangement is deemed illegal per se.”141  This seems too facile.  As 
Professor Liebeler recognized some years ago, “The statement that someone ‘imposed’ 
something is not a meaningful statement in economic terms, and, in addition, is a poor 
way to determine whether an arrangement is horizontal or vertical.  . . . A more relevant 
inquiry is whether an arrangement has the potential to restrict output.”142 Yet although the 
                                                
138 L. C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 625 F. Supp. 477 (M.D.N.C. 1985). 
139 See Zwirb, supra note xx at 1316 (“Rather than focusing on the economic impact of Exxon's 
distribution arrangements, the court fruitlessly attempted to determine which aspect 
'predominated'--the vertical or horizontal corporate personality.”). 
140 H&B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester, 577 F.2d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1978). 
141 Zwirb, supra note xx at 1287. 
142 Liebeler, Book Review, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1334 n. 41 (1978) (reviewing R. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978)). 
 This is not to say that source is irrelevant.  As Herb Hovenkamp explains: “The two 
distinguishing features of intrabrand restraints are that they explicitly control only a particular 
manufacturer’s own brand, and powerful dealers have an incentive to impose them, sometimes 
for anti-competitive purposes. So one can draw this pair of generalizations: intrabrand restraints 
initiated by manufacturers acting without coercion from their dealers are almost certain to be 
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source inquiry does not establish a restraint’s competitive effects, courts sometimes 
devote significant time into determining the source of the restraint.143   
The vertical-horizontal categorization process in dual distribution cases does not 
lead to better results.  Courts invest significant resources debating whether a particular 
restraint within a dual distribution scheme is horizontal or vertical.144  And while the 
vertical-horizontal characterization is often dispositive in dual distribution cases, that 
inquiry says little about the actual economic effects of a given restraint within a dual 
distribution framework.145 
 Ironically, in their zeal to categorize, some courts even perform a rule of reason 
analysis in order to determine whether the restraint at issue is vertical and thus should be 
analyzed under the rule of reason!  In addition to examining the source of the restraint, 
courts in dual distribution cases will sometimes scrutinize “the purpose and effect of the 
restraint in order to determine whether the restraint was horizontal or vertical.”146  In 
several cases, courts “have examined the origin, purpose and effect of the restraint and 
                                                                                                                                            
competitive. By contrast, restraints imposed on manufacturers by powerful dealers or dealers’ 
groups are more likely to be anticompetitive.” HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra 
note xx at 185.  But it is wasteful to explain the source in order to characterize the restraint before 
applying a rule of reason, instead of simply considering the source in order to predict the 
restraint’s effect on output. 
143 See Abadir, at 427 n.5 (“Thus, vertical market-distributing agreements must truly be imposed 
by a supplier, in fact.  Market-distributing agreements which are initiated by distributors are 
horizontal, even if the supplier is nominally a party to the contract.”). 
144 See Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473 (“Although a manufacturer's relationship with its 
distributors has a horizontal aspect when it acts as a distributor itself, it remains primarily a 
vertical relationship. A manufacturer retains some right to place restraints on its distributors to 
improve its ability to compete in the product market.”). 
145 Zwirb, supra note xx at 1291 (“Decisions that characterize arrangements on the basis of form 
or source can hardly be described as opinions based on ‘economic effect.’”). 
146 Casey, supra note xx at 444 (discussing Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 
1190, 1197 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
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have then proceeded to classify it as either horizontal or vertical.”147 For example, in one 
case, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “the [dual distributor’s] restraints were vertical 
because they resulted in a guaranteed year-round market for the product. Therefore, the 
court concluded that the rule of reason was the appropriate standard to evaluate the dual 
distributor restraints.”148  The court essentially concludes that its quick rule of reason 
analysis suggests a procompetitive explanation for the restraint, and therefore argues that 
the restraint must be vertical because that characterization allows the court to apply the 
rule of reason.  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has “conclude[d] that, in the absence of proof 
of anti-competitive purpose or effect, dual distribution systems must be evaluated under 
the traditional rule of reason standard.”149 This makes little sense; looking for proof of 
anticompetitive effects is rule of reason analysis and finding proof of such effects 
essentially establishes the prima facie case under the rule of reason.  
Categorization here has become the end instead of the means.  It focuses attention 
on the wrong issue as courts look at the effects of the restraint to determine its category 
instead of its legality.  That is exactly backwards.  The reason that dual distribution 
schemes do not violate antitrust laws is not because they are vertical, but because they 
generally do not unreasonably restrain competition.  Once the court has determined that 
                                                
147 Brett & Wallace supra note xx at 995-96 (citing Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 
585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Dougherty v. Continental Oil 
Co., 579 F.2d 954  (5th Cir. 1978), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 
1979); Westpoint Pepperell, Inc. v. Rea, 1980-2 Trade Cas. 75,739 (N.D. Cal.); Krehl v. Baskin-
Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 78,699 (C.D. Cal.); Amway Corp., [1976-1979 
Transfer Binder] TRADE REC. REP. (CCH) i 21,574 (FTC May 8, 1979); 91 F.T.C. at 517; 
Guild Wineries and Distilleries v. J. Sosnick 8c Son, 102 Cal. App. 3d 627, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87 
(1980)). 
148 Casey, supra note xx at 441 (discussing Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp.). 
149  Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1357 (9th Cir. 1982). But note that 
the court also asserted that “our inquiry focuses not on whether the vertical or horizontal aspects 
of the system predominate, but rather, on the actual competitive impact of the dual distribution 
system employed…” Id. at 1356.  
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the challenged restraint does not unreasonably restrain competition, the section one 
inquiry should end, not proceed to a categorization step that is, at best, unnecessary. 
 Of course, many courts do consider the effects of a challenged restraint150 and 
some simply hold that restraints within dual distribution schemes are analyzed under the 
rule of reason without regard to the vertical/horizontal classification.151  This rule of 
reason analysis, not an artificial categorization, is how antitrust analysis of dual 
distribution should be performed.152 
 
   c. Group Boycotts 
The horizontal-vertical distinction also creates confusion in the application of the 
per se rule to group boycotts.  Although the Supreme Court had initially condemned 
group boycotts as per se illegal,153  the Court’s subsequent erosion of the per se rule has 
led lower courts to characterize group boycotts as either horizontal or vertical, and to 
reserve per se condemnation for those concerted refusals to deal where there is 
“concerted activity between two or more horizontal competitors.”154  Conversely, “[t]he 
                                                
150 See Red Diamond at 1004-05 (“That Liquid also distributed some of its own goods does not 
alter the situation.  When a producer elects to market its goods through distributors, the latter are 
not, in an economic sense, competitors of the producer even though the producer also markets 
some of its goods itself.”); see also See Zwirb, supra note xx at 1309 (“Red Diamond is thus 
distinctive for integrating economic insights into a formalistic framework.”). 
151 Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 65,284, at 
69,668 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The better-reasoned decisions 
have held that a rule of reason analysis is applicable in dual distribution systems.”); see also 
Zwirb, supra note xx at 1313 (“Instead of becoming immersed in a classification controversy, the 
Sixth Circuit simply stated that dual distributor restrictions are analyzed by the rule of reason.”) 
(discussing Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
152 See infra notes __ to __ and accompanying text.  
153 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).  For a discussion of the 
history, see supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
154 Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet & Millwork, 710 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir.1983); 
Brookins v. Intl Motor Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[P]recedent limits the 
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per se rule is never applied automatically when the concerted refusal to deal is vertical, 
rather than horizontal.”155  This raises the issue of what makes a boycott “horizontal.”  
Some courts hold that the challenged “boycott must originate among the horizontal 
competitors,”156 just as courts have held in the dual distribution context.  Others say 
merely that “[s]ome horizontal concert of action must be taken against the victims of the 
restraint in order for the per se rule to apply.”157   
 Importing the horizontal versus vertical dichotomy into boycott jurisprudence is 
particularly cumbersome – even more so than with territorial restraints – because 
boycotts often involve multiple relationships.  For example, in Klor’s, the ringleader of 
the alleged conspiracy (Broadway Hale) was a competitor of the plaintiff, but was not in 
a horizontal relationship with any of the other conspirators, none of whom were rivals of 
the plaintiff.158  Despite this, some lower courts focus on the “obvious horizontal 
character to the conspiracy” in Klor’s.159  Yet, under the reasoning of Sealy, the concerted 
refusal to deal would seem to be vertically driven.  Broadway-Hale was neither controlled 
by nor competing against any other member of the conspiracy.  At the end of the day, we 
are left with courts investing their time considering whether a particular group boycott is 
horizontal, instead of whether it is having anticompetitive effects.160  
 
                                                                                                                                            
per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct 
competitors.” (quoting Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998))). 
155  Tominaga v. Shepard, 682 F.Supp. 1489, 1495 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (citation omitted). 
156 Flash Elec., Inc. v. Universal Music & Video Dist. Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 379, 388 n.4 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
157 Tominaga v. Shepard, 682 F.Supp. 1489, 1495 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (citing Gough v. Rossmoor 
Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 387 (9th Cir.1978)). 
158 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
159 Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter’s Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 590-91 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
160 See Rossi, 156 F.3d at 462. 
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   d. Summary 
 The disparate treatment between vertical and horizontal restraints is theoretically 
a function of their different economic effects.  The Court reiterated this year in Leegin 
that its “recent cases formulate antitrust principles in accordance with the appreciated 
differences in economic effect between vertical and horizontal agreements…”161  Thus, 
according to the Court, restraints denominated as vertical should receive more deferential 
treatment than those adjudged to be horizontal.162  While such an approach is defensible 
as a theoretical matter, the practical effect has been to convert antitrust litigation into a 
laborious process of characterization and mischaracterization in which the actual 
economic effects of the challenged restraint play a minor role in the antitrust analysis.  
The differences between vertical and horizontal conduct can sometimes be significant, 
but they are not the beginning and the end of the inquiry.  Making them so simply leads 
to fights over which box should hold conduct that often doesn’t easily fit into any box. 
 
2. Voluntary versus Coerced. 
The distinction between voluntary and coerced patent licenses we identified 
above163 is naturally manipulable. While in the abstract there may be some transactions 
that are clearly voluntary and others that are coerced, in some sense all contracts could be 
characterized as either voluntary (the licensee did after all agree to the terms) or coerced 
                                                
161 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). 
162 See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (“In later 
cases, however, the Court rejected the approach of reliance on rules governing horizontal 
restraints when defining rules applicable to vertical ones. See, e.g., Business Electronics, supra, at 
734, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (disclaiming the “notion of equivalence between the scope of horizontal per 
se illegality and that of vertical per se illegality”); Maricopa County, supra, at 348, n. 18, 102 
S.Ct. 2466 (noting that “horizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical 
restraints”).”). 
163   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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(licensors presumably extracted as much value as they could from the licensees, and they 
would not have needed the license were it not for at least an implicit threat of patent suit). 
Further, even if there is a theoretical distinction we might want to maintain, as a practical 
matter the question of coercion will be effectively impossible to prove in court. The 
parties might reasonably be expected to contradict each other in testifying on the issue, 
either because one is lying or because they have different perspectives on voluntariness. 
Nor will a contract recital of voluntariness tell us much about the actual state of affairs, 
since someone coerced into signing a license presumably can be coerced into signing one 
that recites that it is voluntary. The ability of licensees to acquire individual rather than 
group patent licenses may bear on voluntariness, though cases such as this often involve 
package licenses offered at a discount off of the collective price of individual licenses.   
Something similar is likely in the copyright block booking cases. Even if we 
could determine in extreme cases whether a package license of copyrighted works was 
voluntary or not, we will face intermediate cases in which copyright owners offer 
package discounts. Unless we are willing to ban all package discounts of information-
based goods – something antitrust law is clearly unwilling to do in other areas – the 
“voluntary vs. coerced” distinction will be subject to characterization problems. 
It is true that there are some limited circumstances in which coerced package 
licensing or block booking may have negative consequences that voluntary deals would 
not.  Licensees dealing with a patent pool, for instance, will likely be willing to take 
licenses to patents essential to the technology but would not voluntarily agree to take 
licenses to other patents that are competitive with rather than complementary to their own 
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products.164  But the fact that there is something to the distinction in theory doesn’t mean 
that it will work in practice. Licensors who want to coerce agreement to package terms 
will try to manipulate the transaction to make it appear voluntary, and licensees will often 
have the opposite incentive. The result is the creation of boxes that map imperfectly, if at 
all, to actual economic effects.  Here, too, we would be better off inquiring into those 
economic effects than into whether the conduct fits into an artificial category the law has 
created. 
 
  3. Unilateral v. Concerted Conduct 
 The distinction between unilateral and concerted action is fundamental because it 
serves to distinguish section 1 from section 2 of the Sherman Act.  This is important 
because section 2 does not treat any unilateral conduct as per se illegal.  And if two 
competitors merge into one company, we apply an alternative rule, derived from section 
7 of the Clayton Act: whether the merger is likely to substantially lessen competition or 
lead to a monopoly.165 
 The fundamental distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct makes a 
good deal of sense as a matter of antitrust policy. Unilateral acts have the potential for 
productive efficiencies generally lacking in agreements between competitors. They are 
also much harder to police, since companies have to make pricing and output decisions, 
while they don’t have to agree with competitors. For both reasons, the administrative and 
                                                
164   In its most recent treatment of the issue, the Federal Circuit rejected the essentiality criterion 
in evaluating patent pools.  U.S. International Trade Comm’n v. Philips, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  This was a mistake.  Limiting a pool to essential patents serves the useful purpose of 
permitting competition where it is possible.  But just because we believe the essential-non-
essential patent distinction is important doesn’t mean it, or any other category, should necessarily 
be determinative. 
165   15 U.S.C. § 18. 
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error costs are much greater when policing unilateral acts than when policing agreements. 
Accordingly, the law treats agreements, especially among competitors, much more 
harshly than unilateral conduct. 
The fact that this distinction makes sense does not prevent it from being 
manipulated, however. Companies aware of the distinction naturally seek to characterize 
their conduct as unilateral rather than concerted. This has led to difficult evidentiary 
questions where defendants act in parallel, but deny that they have acted in concert.166  It 
has also led to the creation of boxes in which we assume without detailed investigation 
that concerted action either does or does not exist.  Four examples follow. 
 
 a. Is it a Joint Venture? Collaborations Among Competitors 
  Joint ventures blur the sharp division between unilateral and concerted action. Is a 
joint venture between competitors simply an agreement between independent entities, 
subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act? Or is it effectively the creation of a new merged 
entity subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act? Courts have taken both positions.167 And 
whichever position courts take, they then must face the separate problem of whether and 
how to police the dealings between the joint venture and its parents. That relationship 
could be characterized either as dealing among competitors (subject to section 1) or as 
dealings within a corporate entity (subject to Copperweld and therefore virtually immune 
                                                
166   See Champagne Metals v. Ken-Mac Metals, Inc., 458 F.3d  1073 (10th Cir. 2006) (reversing 
district court determination that concerted conduct could not be proven); William H. Page, 
Communication and Concerted Action, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L. Rev. 405 (2007) (discussing these 
difficulties, and proposing that plaintiffs must prove that the defendants have actually 
communicated with each other). 
167   Compare Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(evaluating joint venture under section 1) with United States v. Penn-Olin Corp., 378 U.S. 158 
(1964) (evaluating joint venture under section 7 of the Clayton Act).  Cf. FTC Competitor 
Collaboration Guidelines (1998) (evaluating both approaches). 
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from scrutiny).168 Characterization of the joint venture can determine the legality of both 
the venture itself and its agreements with others. This problem of characterization was 
central to the Supreme Court’s recent Dagher case. The Ninth Circuit had held that two 
oil companies that formed a joint venture, ending competition between them and jointly 
refining and marketing gasoline, violated section 1 when they agreed to set the price for 
the oil produced by the joint venture.169 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a joint 
venture did not engage in price fixing when it set the prices at which its members would 
sell through the venture.170 The difference was entirely one of characterization: are two 
companies that forego competition by entering into a joint venture nonetheless two 
companies agreeing on price, or is the joint venture a single entity making its own pricing 
decision? 
 The irony of this characterization debate to an economist is that it arguably 
shouldn’t matter at all. Transactions costs economics thinks of a firm as a collection of 
actors organized into a group because it is more efficient to do so than to deal with each 
other through outside contracts.171 A change in the legal rules that affects outside 
transactions differently than integration into a firm should merely prompt integration or 
disintegration, not a change in the actual behavior of the actors.172 This doesn’t mean 
                                                
168   Guidelines, supra note __, at __. 
169   Dagher v. Saudi Refining, Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). 
170   Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279 (2006). 
171   The founding father of transactions costs economics is Oliver Williamson.  See, e.g., See 
Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance 233-34 (Oxford 1996); Oliver E. 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 30 (Collier Macmillan 1985). TCE is 
itself an offshoot of the Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of 
the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937), reprinted in Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and 
the Law 33 (Chicago 1988). For a flavor of the more general literature on the theory of the firm 
and how law affects firm structure, see generally Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The 
Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. Corp. L. 213 (1993).  
172   For an example, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Brett McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: 
Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 575. 
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antitrust should never treat outside firms differently than inside divisions, of course, but it 
does suggest that if we can’t agree whether to characterize a cooperative or joint venture 
as a single entity or as a group of autonomous would-be competitors, it may not be worth 
wasting a lot of time trying to precisely delineate this boundary. In an ideal world, we 
would analyze the economic effect of the venture without regard to how it is 
characterized.173 
 
   b. Dealer Terminations 
 The second example involves dealer termination cases. The courts had established 
in a series of cases involving termination of dealers by distributors that a distributor 
cannot agree with one dealer to terminate another dealer; to do so is illegal per se.174 The 
worry is that dealers have an incentive to eliminate price-cutting competitors, and if they 
can collectively pressure the distributor to terminate the price-cutter, they can enforce 
higher retail prices.175 Nor can distributors agree with the price-cutting dealer to stop 
discounting, because doing so is a concerted agreement to set minimum resale prices, and 
                                                
173   The FTC took a significant step towards letting the economic effects rather than the form of 
the venture determine the outcome in its Competitor Collaboration Guidelines.  Guidelines, supra 
note __, at __. But courts have yet to take the same approach. 
 To be fair, the result of the Dagher case is not expressly to insulate joint venture pricing 
from review, but rather to apply the rule of reason. We think the rule of reason may well be the 
right test here. But the references to the joint venture as a single entity making a unilateral pricing 
decision suggests that the Copperweld rule of virtually per se legality may end up applying to 
such arrangements. 
174   See, e.g., Cernuto,Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir .1979); Bostick Oil Co. 
v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1213-15 (4th Cir. 1983).  This rule survived Monsanto v. 
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); that decision set a high pleading standard for 
proof of agreement, but maintained the rule that such agreement, if proven, is illegal per se. 
175   Whether this concern actually makes sense is open to question, but that’s not directly relevant 
to our point in this section. 
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therefore was also illegal per se until 2007, and is now judged under the rule of reason.176 
In Monsanto v. Spray-Rite,177 however, the Court held that a distributor who could not 
agree with its dealer was nonetheless free to unilaterally announce a set of rules with 
which all dealers must comply and to terminate dealers who fail to do so. Further, it set a 
high standard of proof for agreement in such a case, requiring evidence of “a conscious 
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.”178  In a 
case such as this, the line between a dealer-distributor agreement and a unilateral 
restriction starts to blur. Agree with dealers on a policy and your conduct is illegal per se.  
Announce the identical policy yourself, even if everyone knows that you are responding 
to pressure from dealers, and it’s not.179  That distinction makes little sense.180 
 The Court’s decision four years later in Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics 
added a new dimension to this artificial distinction.181  That case held that agreements to 
terminate a price cutter are only per se illegal if there is also an “agreement on price 
levels.”182  It therefore took the per se illegal box created by Monsanto – agreements to 
terminate dealers – and further carved it into two sub-boxes, one for agreements that 
specifically set a price and another for agreements that don’t.  This distinction makes 
even less sense than Monsanto’s.  Termination of price cutters will serve to stabilize a 
                                                
176   Colgate & Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (per se rule); Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods. v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007). 
177   Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 752. 
178   Id. at 768. 
179   For a discussion of the evidentiary problems in drawing this line, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 468 (3d ed. 2005). 
180   See also Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 5, 
73-78 (2004).  Meese goes on to argue that this justifies per se legality for all vertical conduct.  
Id. at 78-80.  We disagree.  Conduct that is sometimes anticompetitive and sometimes legitimate 
should not be per se illegal, but neither should it be per se legal. 
181   485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
182   Id. at 728. 
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horizontal cartel among manufacturers even without an explicit agreement on price 
between each manufacturer and distributor.  And after Business Electronics, 
manufacturers and distributors can agree to terminate any particular price cutter – and 
even agree to terminate them expressly because they cut prices – so long as they don’t 
actually agree on what price level is too low.  Perhaps Business Electronics really wanted 
to eliminate the per se rule entirely from vertical cases – the Court took a big step in that 
direction this Term183 – but there is no logic to the line they in fact ended up drawing. 
 
   c. Conditional Refusals to Deal 
 A final, related example involves a series of efforts by the makers of durable 
goods to capture a previously competitive aftermarket for parts and service for their 
goods. In a series of cases involving the makers of photocopiers and computer systems, 
courts faced restrictions imposed by the antitrust defendant on the use of independent 
service organizations.184 These restrictions often took the form of rules that refused to 
provide spare parts to ISOs or to customers who used ISOs.  Plaintiffs characterized this 
as a tying arrangement, something that the law treats as concerted action. Defendants 
responded by arguing that their policy was unilateral and did not require agreement with 
the customers. In fact, the answer is somewhere in between – the rule imposed by the 
                                                
183    Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007).  Some have argued that 
vertical restraints of this sort can never be anticompetitive.  See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, 
supra note __, at __; Bork, Antitrust Paradox, supra note __, at __.  But as Judge Richard 
Posner has explained, such conduct can in some circumstances be anticompetitive.  Richard A. 
Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 229 (2005); Richard A. 
Posner, Vertical Restrictions and “Fragile” Monopoly, 50 Antitrust Bull. 499, 500-503 (2005) 
(discussing Standard Fashions exclusive dealing example). 
184   In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Data General 
v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak, 
125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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durable goods manufacturer is not really an agreement,185 but neither is it truly a 
unilateral refusal to deal. Rather, it is a conditional refusal to deal, a hybrid that – like the 
conditional rules in Monsanto -- is neither truly unilateral nor truly concerted.186 An 
antitrust rule that creates a sharp division between unilateral and concerted conduct has 
difficulty dealing with intermediate cases such as conditional refusals to deal. 
 
   d. Who Is a Single Actor? 
 A final oddity presented by the sharp distinction between unilateral and concerted 
conduct involves determining what constitutes a single entity.  In Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube,187 the Court held – quite sensibly – that a corporation could not 
conspire with itself.  In that case, the defendants were a parent corporation and its wholly 
owned subsidiary.  The Court determined that they had “a complete unity of interest,” 
and so should not be treated as conspirators for antitrust purposes.  This makes sense; a 
parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary were unlikely to compete with each other in the 
absence of an agreement.  In fact, it makes sufficient sense that an outsider might wonder 
that the case was brought at all.  The reason has to do with the distinction between 
unilateral and concerted conduct.  Because agreements are treated more harshly than 
unilateral conduct, there is a strong incentive for antitrust plaintiffs to find a conspiracy 
somewhere in order to take advantage of a more advantageous legal rule.   
 Copperweld closes the door on efforts to game that particular box, but it opens 
another.  What if the parent company holds less than complete ownership in another 
                                                
185 See Christopher R. Leslie, Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and Antitrust's 
Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST.L.J. 1773 (1999). 
186   For elaboration, see 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP & Antitrust §13.4b. 
187     467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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company?  If it owns a majority share in and exercises control over that company, 
Copperweld should still apply, but if only one of those things is true, the case for treating 
the two as a single economic entity gets weaker.  And we can push the line even further; 
the Seventh Circuit has held that the National Basketball Association is a single entity, 
not a collection of different teams, for antitrust purposes, even though the teams are 
separately owned and retain control over most of their decisions.188  Chicago 
Professional Sports shows that it is just as easy for defendants as plaintiffs to game the 
unilateral-concerted divide.189 
 
C. Categories That Lie 
 The point of putting particular types of conduct into the per se and rule of reason 
boxes is to identify a set of cases that can be resolved without a detailed inquiry into the 
facts or the competitive effects of each individual practice. In at least one important set of 
cases, however – tying arrangements – federal courts call a practice per se illegal without 
in fact treating it as per se illegal.190  Tying arrangements are listed as a per se category in 
hundreds of antitrust cases.  But unlike other categories of trade restraints treated as per 
se illegal, the per se test as applied to tying arrangements requires the plaintiff to prove 
four elements: “(1) the tying and tied goods are two separate products; (2) the defendant 
has market power in the tying product market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no 
                                                
188   Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996). 
189   For a discussion of the complexities of determining whether entities in a corporate 
relationship are one actor or two, see, e.g., Dean V. Williamson, Organization, Control and the 
Single Entity Defense in Antitrust, available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2200&context=alea (working paper April 
2007). 
190   As we noted supra notes __-__ and accompanying text, group boycotts may also be an 
example of a category that lies, depending on how one interprets the group boycott cases. 
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choice but to purchase the tied product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a 
substantial volume of commerce.”191   
 This test for per se illegality is not truly a per se test.  As one of the authors has 
explained “tying arrangements are really only nominally per se illegal. The per se rule 
against tie-ins is nominal because: (1) it requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant 
has market power over the tying product, (2) it requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a 
not insubstantial dollar volume of commerce in the tied product market is affected, and 
(3) it permits the defendant to argue that she has a legitimate business justification for 
imposing a tie-in. … None of these conditions is present in a true per se scenario.”192  
The traditional per se test requires no showing of market power,193  and defendants whose 
conduct falls in other per se categories are not able to argue that business rationales 
validate their conduct, but tying defendants can.194 
 Despite the fact that under the clear language of the so-called per se test for tying, 
tie-ins are not, in fact, per se illegal, the Court refuses to alter the categorical label.  
Although writing for a four-Justice concurrence in Jefferson Parish, Justice O’Connor 
argued that “[t]he time has …come to abandon the ‘per se’ label” applied to tie-ins,195 a 
                                                
191 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984)). If the plaintiff cannot establish these four elements, she can still argue that 
the tie-in violates the rule of reason. 
192 Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam's Razor: A Simple 
Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TULANE LAW REVIEW 727, 735 (2004). 
193 Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Where a 
plaintiff proves conduct that falls within a per se category, nothing more is needed for liability; 
the defendants' power, illicit purpose and anticompetitive effect are all said to be irrelevant.”) 
(citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 
(1940)). 
194 Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North American, Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(“Technically, there is no ‘violation’ of the Sherman Act if the defendant prevails on a business 
justification defense.”). 
195  466 U.S. at 35. 
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majority of the Court asserted that “[i]t is far too late in the history of our antitrust 
jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an 
unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”196  So 
the Court maintained the per se label, but added rule of reason elements to the so-called 
per se test for tying.197 
 While it may seem of no moment whether tie-ins are called per se illegal so long 
as they are evaluated under their own modified rule of reason, the miscategorization of 
tying arrangements has consequences.  Although the Jefferson Parish majority claimed 
that it cared about “competitive consequences,” not labels,198 categories matter in 
antitrust.  Once the per se label is attached to conduct, antitrust liability attaches without 
proof of anti-competitive effects.  Courts across most circuits have held that once the per 
se elements of a tying claim are established, “tying arrangements are illegal in and of 
themselves, without any requirement that the plaintiff make a showing of unreasonable 
competitive effect.”199  The ill-placed per se label used in tying jurisprudence requires the 
court to define product markets, examine market power, and consider business 
justifications, yet not to examine the one factor that matters most: whether the tie-ins 
                                                
196 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984). 
197 See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 833 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir.1987) (The 
Jefferson Parish Court “rather than abandoning the per se rule against tying, chose to limit 
antitrust liability for tie-ins by insisting on a showing of actual market power in the tying 
product.”). 
198 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 n.34 (1984) (“The legality of 
petitioners’ conduct depends on its competitive consequences, not whether it can be labeled 
“tying.” If the competitive consequences of this arrangement are not those to which the per se 
rule is addressed, then it should not be condemned irrespective of its label.”). 
199 Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 540-41(9th Cir. 1983) (citing  
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969).); Town Sound 
and Custom Tops, 959 F.2d at 477 (holding that if the plaintiff satisfies the three-part per se tying 
test, “then the defendant's tying practices are automatically illegal without further proof of 
anticompetitive effect”); Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) (If 
the court applies the per se approach then the “tying arrangement is illegal” without a showing 
that it “restrain[s] competition unreasonably.”) (citations omitted). 
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unreasonably restrained trade.  This ill-conceived and outmoded categorization creates 
the worst of the both worlds – the cost of the rule of reason without its precision.200  The 
modified per se rule also creates a disconnect between section 1 and section 2 tying 
claims, since under section 2 more will be required.   
 To be sure, there might be an argument for a “middle” category if we thought that 
tying arrangements were anticompetitive if but only if the defendant had market power. 
But we’re not persuaded that this two-sided correspondence between market power and 
anticompetitive effect is in fact true.201 The effect of this mischaracterization is that many 
courts do not sufficiently consider the likely (or actual) competitive effects of a 
challenged tie.  Instead, they condemn tying arrangements that are likely to have no 
anticompetitive effects, simply because the particular tie-in satisfies the elements of 
tying’s so-called per se test. In our view, tying belongs in the rule of reason box. But even 
if it doesn’t – if there is a strong correspondence between market power and 
anticompetitive effect – courts should be up front about the creation of this intermediate 
category, rather than diluting the per se rule by calling things per se illegal that really 
aren’t. 
                                                
200 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34-35 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“As a result, tying doctrine incurs the costs of a rule of reason 
approach without achieving its benefits: the doctrine calls for the extensive and time-consuming 
economic analysis characteristic of the rule of reason, but then may be interpreted to prohibit 
arrangements that economic analysis would show to be beneficial. Moreover, the per se label in 
the tying context has generated more confusion than coherent law because it appears to invite 
lower courts to omit the analysis of economic circumstances of the tie that has always been a 
necessary element of tying analysis.”). 
201   For an argument justifying a version of that distinction on the basis that tying conspiracies 
are more harmful than unilateral tying, see Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 2247 (2007).  But cf. Jean Tirole, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, 1 Comp. 
Pol’y Int’l 1 (2005) (arguing for a unified treatment of all tying cases).  But Leslie’s argument 
deals only with horizontal conspiracies among competitors to impose ties on their customers.  It 
does not extend to the full scope of the current “per se” rule in section 1 tying cases. 
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 Tying is an example of a category that lies, because it claims to be a per se 
rule but in fact involves many of the indicia of a rule of reason inquiry.  Interestingly, 
Michael Carrier has suggested that rule of reason analysis itself may be an example in the 
opposite direction.  Under the rule of reason, courts are supposed to balance the 
procompetitive benefits of conduct against its potential for anticompetitive harm.  Carrier 
studies cases actually decided under section one and concluded that they tend to 
substitute burden-shifting presumptions for real balancing analysis.202  He finds that 
courts dismiss most cases on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to show a significant 
anticompetitive effect.  To some extent, Carrier’s analysis may simply reflect evidence 
produced in the balancing inquiry, rather than a rejection of that inquiry.  For example, if 
the plaintiff cannot prove market power in a section one case, it arguably makes sense not 
to proceed further under the rule of reason, since section one usually presumes harm only 
if a plaintiff has market power.203  But if Carrier is correct that more is going on here, rule 
of reason analysis may itself be a category that lies. 
 
 
 D. Categories That Are Nonsensical 
 Most of the categories we discuss in this paper, however problematic, are 
designed to get at distinctions that have some logical basis. Occasionally, however, 
antitrust courts adopt categories that simply make no sense. An example is the long-
standing rule set out in General Electric v. United States that distinguishes between sales 
                                                
202 Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265.  Cf. 
Elhauge, supra note __ at 253 (challenging the way that cost-benefit analysis is applied in monopolization 
cases). 
203 But see Dennis Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 Comp. Pol’y Int’l 1 (2007) (arguing that 
market power is an elusive concept that should not play a major role in antitrust analysis). 
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and “licenses” of patented products.204 Antitrust law traditionally made resale price 
maintenance – the control over the price at which a buyer of a product can resell it – 
illegal per se.205 But in General Electric, the Court said that that rule would be reversed if 
the supplier did not actually sell the product, but merely “licensed” it to the buyer. In that 
circumstance, even if the supplier physically transfers the goods to the buyer, the Court 
said price controls imposed by the supplier on the buyer were legal per se.206  
 There are a number of problems with the General Electric approach, not least the 
fact that the supplier and buyer in that case were actually competitors, and so allowing 
price control directly facilitated a cartel.207 Courts have criticized and limited General 
Electric,208 and four Justices voted to overrule it in the 1940s,209 but it remains the law. In 
this article, however, our concern is not so much with the unfortunate substantive 
dimensions of the General Electric rule as with the illogic of the categorical distinction 
between sales and licenses. Our experience with a similar distinction in software 
contracting is not promising: it has become an artificial distinction designed to reach 
particular legal results, not a distinction grounded in actual fact.210 The problem is even 
worse in antitrust law. It is trivial to manipulate the sale-license distinction, and the fact 
that the consequences of the distinction are so sharp – per se legality versus per se 
                                                
204   272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
205   Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911).  In 2007, the Supreme 
Court overruled Dr. Miles in Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., __ S.Ct. __ (June 28, 
2007) (holding that resale price maintenance should be governed by the rule of reason).   
206   General Electric, 272 U.S. at 490.  Because General Electric created a rule of per se legality, 
the recent decision in Leegin to apply the rule of reason to other resale price maintenance 
schemes does not eliminate the effects of the sale-license distinction. 
207   See 2 Hovenkamp et al., supra note __, at §31.1b, 31.1c. 
208   See id. § 31.2. 
209   Line Material Co. v. United States, 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
210   For discussions of the artificiality of this distinction, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., 
Software and Internet Law 317-24 (3d ed. 2006); David Nimmer, The Metamorphosis of 
Contract Into Expand, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 17 (1999); Jessica Litman, The Tales That Article 2B 
Tells, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 931 (1998). 
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illegality – provide ample reason to do so.211 Worse, there is no real consequence 
underlying the distinction. Transactions are not systematically less likely to be 
anticompetitive if structured as licenses rather than sales. We have created a rule that not 
only encourages manipulation and can facilitate cartels, but which has no affirmative 
value.212 
 
E. Different Category Labels For the Same Conduct 
 In the examples we have discussed so far, the courts have established rules that 
put cases into different boxes based on factual differences. We have argued that those 
factual differences are often not as important as the courts seem to think, that they are 
subject to manipulation, and that they can end up changing over time in surprising ways. 
In some cases, though, the problem is even worse. In the examples we consider in this 
section, the very same conduct will be treated differently by the courts depending on 
whether the courts give them one label or another. 
 
  1. Predatory Bundling 
 One important set of cases involves the bundling of different products. Bundling 
of two different products has traditionally been treated under the law of tying 
arrangements. As noted above, ties are illegal if they are coerced, the defendant has 
                                                
211   Even after Leegin, which changed the rule against resale price maintenance from a per se rule 
to a rule of reason, there is still substantial value to an antitrust defendant of fitting into the per se 
legality box of General Electric. 
212   In one context, the Robinson-Patman Act, the statute appears to require this distinction, 
because it applies only to sales.  See Laitram Machinery, Inc. v. Carnitech A/S, 884 F.Supp. 1074, 
1079-80 (E.D. La. 1995).  We think that’s a silly distinction too, but since it is one created by 
Congress, only Congress can undo it.  General Electric was foisted on the world by the courts, 
and the courts can undo it. 
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market power in the tying product, and there is an effect on the market for the tied 
product. While coercion normally involves a contractual requirement that the customer 
purchase product A if they want product B, courts have been willing to expand the 
concept of a tying arrangement to cases in which there is no express requirement but in 
which the financial incentives to purchase the products together are so strong that it is 
impractical to buy the goods separately.213  
 A more recent line of cases starting with LePage’s v. 3M214 treats the same sort of 
conduct under the label “predatory bundling.” In LePage’s, the defendant, 3M, made 
hundreds of diverse products.  In some markets, it possessed considerable market power, 
while in others it faced significant competition. 3M had dominated the market for 
transparent tape, but was facing serious competition from LePage’s.  In response, 3M 
devised a “bundled rebate” program whereby retailers would receive ever increasing 
rebates as they met targets by purchasing products across 3M's various product lines.  As 
a result, even if retailers saved money by purchasing their tape from LePage’s, they 
would lose significantly more in rebates across non-tape products that 3M had bundled 
with the tape.   
The case illustrates how antitrust labels can be manipulated.  The Third Circuit en 
banc affirmed the jury verdict against 3M, holding that predatory bundling can violate 
section two.  3M attempted to characterize LePage’s claim as one of predatory pricing.  
                                                
213   See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 50 (1962).  Similarly, the first United 
States v. Microsoft case involved charges that Microsoft had imposed a de facto exclusive dealing 
arrangement by imposing a “per processor” license, under which computer makers could install 
whatever operating system they liked, but were obligated to pay Microsoft for each computer 
they shipped whether or not it contained the Microsoft OS.  1995 WL 505998 (D.D.C. 1995).  
The Antitrust Division alleged that the effect of this agreement was to force computer makers to 
load only Microsoft software, since to load other software they would have had to pay twice. 
 
214   324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
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This is hardly surprising given that the Supreme Court has made predatory pricing a 
disfavored claim, which rarely succeeds.  Alternatively, 3M’s bundled rebate scheme 
could also be characterized as a tying arrangement since retailers who desired non-tape 
products from 3M were economically compelled to purchase tape as well given the rebate 
structure. Importantly, the legal standards the court applies to predatory bundling are 
different than the standards courts use in tying cases or in predatory pricing cases, even 
though the very same conduct will be at issue in many (though not all) cases.215  In at 
least some cases, therefore, whether the conduct is legal or not will depend on whether 
the conduct is put into the tying box (per se illegal, at least after market power is shown), 
the predatory pricing box (per se legal unless the price charged is below marginal cost), 
or the predatory bundling box (in which case the rule of reason is applied).216   
 
 2. Refusals to License IP Rights 
 A second example involves the treatment of potential liability for intellectual 
property owners who unilaterally refuse to license their IP rights to others. In a series of 
cases in the late 1990s, the courts of appeals created a varied set of rules for such 
“unilateral refusals to license.” These rules vary, from an intent-based focus in the Ninth 
                                                
215   See also Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution, 23 Yale J. Reg. 
169 (2006) (“Antitrust law has designed rules for each of these practices independently, ignoring 
the economic relationships between these business practices.”). 
216   The Ninth Circuit has sought to explain the relationship between bundling and predatory pricing, 
holding that bundling is not exclusionary unless it results in below-cost prices.  See Cascade Health 
Solutions v. PeaceHealth, LLC, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 2007). 
For an argument that product bundling under LePage’s must be tested under predatory 
pricing standards, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 841; 
Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 Emory L.J. 425 
(2006).  For an argument that it should be treated under the rule of reason, with a quick look 
initially applied, see Jonathan M. Lave, The Law and Economics of De Facto Exclusive Dealing, 
50 Antitrust Bull. 143, 147 (2005).  For an argument for a safe harbor based on market share, see 
Wright, supra note __, at 169.  
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Circuit to a virtual rule of per se legality for unilateral refusals to license in the Federal 
Circuit.217 But in the dispute over the right standard for unilateral refusals to license IP, 
these courts have ignored a different legal doctrine that covers precisely the same conduct 
– the essential facilities doctrine. That doctrine also governs unilateral refusals to allow a 
plaintiff access to a facility, but it has an entirely different set of legal standards. Courts 
have generally applied the unilateral refusal to license caselaw to IP and the essential 
facilities caselaw to physical standards, but that correspondence is not absolute.218 More 
to the point, there is no reason that IP should be subject to a different set of rules than 
physical products. There may be reasons the two should lead to different results, for 
example because of the need to encourage innovation inherent in the IP system, but there 
is no reason to apply completely different legal rules. Once again, the outcome of a case 
may depend on nothing more than the choice of which legal rule to apply to the same set 
of facts.  
 
  3. Tying 
 A final example again involves categorizing conduct as involving tying.  Tying 
arrangements require, among other things, proof that the defendant sold two distinct 
products and conditioned the sale of one on the purchase of the other.  And because, as 
we have seen, tying is treated more harshly than unilateral conduct, antitrust plaintiffs 
have an incentive to characterize conduct as involving as tie of two different products 
rather than as monopolization.  The need for characterization makes sense if the purpose 
                                                
217   In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Data General 
v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak, 
125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
218   For a discussion of occasional IP cases litigated under the essential facilities doctrine, see 1 
Hovenkamp et al., supra note __, at §13.3c2. 
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of the anti-tying rule is to prevent firms with market power in one market from 
leveraging it into a separate market.  But if the purpose is to prevent one firm from 
hurting equally or more efficient competitors, the separate products inquiry seems less 
necessary.   
 The separate products inquiry is subject to manipulation.  Is it one product or two 
if the monopolist moves to tie before the market has evolved to allow sufficient 
independent demand for the tied product?  What if there is a demand for the separate 
product, but there is also a strong demand for the two together, as with car stereos or 
tires?  United States v. Microsoft is an obvious example.219  The parties fought for years 
over whether Internet Explorer was a separate product from Windows.  Interestingly, the 
court created a whole new tying rule of reason specific to technological bundles, 
reversing the district court’s finding of liability, and then found exactly the same conduct 
to constitute section 2 monopolization.  The fact that the same conduct gets treated in 
different ways under different legal doctrines demonstrates the needless formalism 
inherent in the categorization approach. 
 
III. A More Nuanced Approach to Antitrust Analysis 
 The reader may be forgiven for concluding at this point that we would abolish all 
categories in antitrust law. Not so. Categorization can serve an important role in antitrust 
analysis. We think, however, that courts must do a better job of considering each form of 
categorization and explicitly determining whether the benefits of categorical analysis in 
that case outweigh the downsides.  In Part II, we itemized the many problems of current 
categorical analysis.  Part III.A and B balance these problems by evaluating the benefits 
                                                
219   253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
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of categorical analysis and weighing them against the general costs of categorization.  
The remainder of Part III will discuss how courts can secure these benefits of categorical 
analysis while avoiding the problems we discussed in Part II. 
 Our discussion fits within a broader framework of legal scholarship on the choice 
between rules and standards. As that literature suggests, the tradeoff is generally one 
between certainty and accuracy.220 If neither costs nor uncertainty were a problem, 
standards would always be preferable to rules in antitrust cases because they are more 
likely to achieve the right result.  That is, everything would be subject to an overarching 
rule of reason.  
 An antitrust jurisprudence based on standards is indeed more likely to reach the 
right result.  But it is also likely to be more costly than a system of simple rules.  The 
time and cost of full-scale antitrust litigation for every non-frivolous lawsuit would 
impose unacceptable costs of litigants and the court system overall as judicial resources 
were devoted to high-demand antitrust cases. The problem is worse than that, however. If 
parties could not reasonably and accurately predict the outcome of an antitrust case, they 
would find it very difficult to make reasonable business decisions. The result might be 
overdeterrence – businesses who avoided legitimate conduct because of the fear that it 
                                                
220   The body of literature on this topic is extensive.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Russell B. Korobkin, 
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23 (2000); 
Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 101 (1997); 
Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based 
Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. 
Rev. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953 (1995). 
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would later be determined to be illegal.221 Or it might be underdeterrence, since plaintiffs 
as well as defendants bear court costs.222 
 Some rules, then, are necessary as a practical matter.  The question is how we 
select the circumstances in which rules are appropriate.  Sometimes rules make sense 
because we have enough experience with a particular practice that what we could learn 
from reconsidering a particular set of facts is not worth the costs of reopening the debate. 
There is no need to repeatedly debate the issue of whether horizontal price-fixing is 
necessarily a bad thing, for example. Antitrust defendants have already tried and failed 
many times to come up with good reasons to permit cartels; we gain very little by letting 
one more defendant have a go at it.  In other cases rules are necessary because even if the 
court would benefit from a case-specific evaluation, the difficulty or uncertainty of the 
evaluation is too great. Antitrust has, for instance, a rule that courts will not consider the 
reasonableness of the fixed price.223  In theory, a standard for what constitutes a 
reasonable price is conceptually possible, but it would be difficult to implement because 
in reality it would be too hard to determine what a “reasonable price” would be. 
 But the administrative efficiency of rules should not always compel us to forego 
the accuracy of standards. The fact that there are classes of behavior that we know 
enough to characterize does not mean that categories are always or even usually the best 
approach. And as we have seen, many of the categories created in antitrust cases either 
make little economic sense or can be gamed so effectively that they do more harm than 
                                                
221   Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984). 
222   Easterbrook didn’t spend much time in his 1984 article worrying about this problem, but as 
antitrust has become far more defendant-friendly in the intervening two decades, it seems a more 
and more salient concern. 
223 U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
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good. Antitrust is out of balance, leaning too heavily in favor of rules rather than 
standards.  In the sections that follow, we explore these issues in more detail. 
 
A. The Value of Categories 
 There are several advantages to using categories when analyzing the 
reasonableness of trade restraints.  First, the proper use of categories facilitates the 
efficient use of judicial resources.  The primary advantage of the per se rule is that it 
“avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic 
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, 
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an 
inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.”224  Full-blown rule of reason analysis 
draws on judicial and party resources much more than the per se approach.225  When 
properly applied, the per se rule allows courts to correctly and efficiently condemn 
manifestly unreasonable agreements.226  For example, bid-rigging is per se illegal, as it 
should be.  Decades of empirical evidence have shown that bid-rigging schemes increase 
the price paid (often for government contracts) without any countervailing 
procompetitive justification.227  While defendants in bid-rigging cases must be allowed to 
                                                
224 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 US. 1,5 (1958). 
225 See HERB HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 105 (2005) (litigating a rule of reason 
case is “one of the most costly procedures in antitrust practice”); Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust 
“Treble” Damages Really Single Damages? 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 147 n.153 (1993) (“For 
example, vertical nonprice cases today probably use more judicial resources on the average than 
they did 20 years ago.”). 
226 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984) (“The rationale for per 
se rules in part is to avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where 
the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of 
determining whether the particular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct.”) (citing Arizona 
v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 350-351 (1982)). 
227 See, e.g., CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES (1973); JOHN G. FULLER, 
THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICE-FIXERS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY (1962). 
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contend that they did not in fact rig any bids, it would unnecessarily waste judicial 
resources to permit them to dispute argue to a jury that their rigged bids were reasonable 
or otherwise justifiable.  The per se approach preserves judicial time and resources to 
better consider those restraints whose competitive effects are less clear.228  
 Second, categories can provide the basis for bright-line legal rules, which 
facilitate business planning by clearly articulating what types of agreements are 
permissible.  Properly implemented, per se rules are bright-line rules that provide 
certainty.229   While firms may not  necessarily favor certain agreements being 
categorically condemned, “per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business 
community.”230  Businesses know not to fix prices or allocate territory with their 
competitors, or to rig bids.  With these profit-maximizing methods off the table, firms can 
concentrate on legal ways to increase their bottom line.   
In addition to categories of restraints that are per se illegal, some conduct is per se 
legal.  Courts have, for instance, created safe harbors that protect unilateral termination of 
dealers231 and allow a monopolist to drive competitors from the market by charging a low 
but above-cost price.  Designed properly, these bright-line rules are perhaps even more 
                                                
228 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 23, THE RULE OF REASON, 3 (1999) 
(“Application of the per se approach frees the court from an inquiry into whether the arrangement 
at issue has actually harmed consumers or thwarted free market competitive forces.”); ABA RULE 
OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 3 (“Indirect cost savings also are achieved by 
allowing regulators and the judiciary to focus resources on cases that are not clearly anticom-
petitive and may present real procompetitive efficiencies.”). 
229 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 US. 1,5 (1958) (The “principle of per se 
unreasonableness … makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more 
certain to the benefit of everyone concerned.”).  
230 GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977). 
231   Monsanto Corp. v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
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valuable because they allow firms to pursue a business strategy openly and aggressively 
without fear of legal liability.  In sum, categories can enhance predictability.232 
 Third, in some cases, categories can provide a red flag for judges about whether a 
challenged restraint is likely to have anticompetitive consequences.  For example, 
horizontal restraints are more likely to cause anticompetitive concerns than vertical 
restraints.  Knowing this helps alert the court to the possibility (or probability) of 
anticompetitive effects when an agreement is clearly both horizontal and price-related.  
Conversely, the court may be less suspicious of a restraint when it is clearly vertical and 
not related to price.  There is nothing wrong with judges using these broad truths as a 
filter.  But this filter only makes sense when the categorization is unambiguous and 
uncontroverted.  The problem lies in courts investing an inordinate amount of time on 
determining the proper category when the purpose of the categorization is to simplify the 
inquiry.   
 
 B. Currently, the Costs of Categories Outweigh Their Benefits.  
 The benefits of categorical analysis need to be balanced against the costs.233  
Despite the potential benefits of categorical analysis, the process of categorization in 
antitrust has unnecessarily imposed significant costs.  Further, the manner in which courts 
have pursued categorical analysis has often undermined the very benefits that a 
categorical approach is intended to achieve.   
                                                
232 See Cavanagh, supra note xx at 1335 (“[Per se] rules are justified when their benefits, such as 
administrative efficiency, ease of application, and predictability, outweigh any negative effects on 
antitrust enforcement.”). 
233   See, e.g., Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct:  Section 2, the Rule of Reason, 
and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 Antitrust L.J. 435, 458 (2006) 
(discussing the tradeoffs between rules and standards in antitrust). 
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 First, the current reliance on categories – especially when coupled with the per se 
rule – risks false positives (i.e., findings of liability when the correct result should be no 
antitrust liability).  When courts focus on categorization instead of competitive effects, it 
increases the probability of mistakes.  The Court has acknowledged that in applying the 
per se rule “[f]or the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have 
tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a full-blown inquiry might have 
proved to be reasonable.”234 But the Court has justified the risk of false positives by 
reasoning that if the categories are drawn appropriately, then instances of false positives 
“are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to 
identify them.”235  Unfortunately, like most bright-line rules, “[p]er se rules always 
contain a degree of arbitrariness”236 and it remains unclear how many false positives are 
created by the current categorical approach.  Certainly in the decade between Schwinn 
and Sylvania, there must have been false positives when non-price vertical restraints were 
condemned as per se illegal.   
 In many instances, it is the obsession with categories that can itself create the 
false positive.  For example, the facile categorization of the agreement in Topco as 
horizontal blinded the Court to the actual competitive effects of agreement among small 
and mid-size grocers to create a new brand of products to compete against larger chain 
                                                
234 Arizona v/ Maricopa county Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); ABA RULE OF REASON 
MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 3-4 (“[o]ccasionally, per se treatment may condemn a practice that 
under a specific set of circumstances might have survived rule of reason analysis; these ‘errors’ 
are tolerated for the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency.”) (citing Arizona v/ 
Maricopa county Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)). 
235 GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977). 
236 United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall J., dissenting); see also 
Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble Damage 
Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1335 
(1987) (“Bright-line rules always contain some degree of arbitrariness.”). 
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stores.  As a result, the Court is widely considered to have reached the wrong result in 
Topco.237   In short, in some cases antitrust condemns anticompetitive agreements that 
have the potential for increasing consumer welfare or are otherwise efficient.238 
In addition to false positives, the current categorical approach probably results in 
false negatives as well.  The conventional wisdom is that vertical restraints evaluated 
under the rule of reason are essentially de facto per se legal since rule of reason cases are 
notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to win.239  As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent 
questioning use of the rule of reason in Leegin, “One cannot fairly expect judges and 
juries in such cases to apply complex economic criteria without making a considerable 
number of mistakes, which themselves may impose serious costs.”240  False negatives are 
bad because anticompetitive conduct – which reduces consumer welfare – goes 
undeterred.  The specific conduct at issue in a particular case can continue unfettered and 
other firms are encouraged to undertake similar inefficient conduct.241   
                                                
237 HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra note __ at 122 (“If stare decisis had been 
applied to a methodology of antitrust analysis, rather than simply to the category of "market 
division," the outcome would have been different.”). 
238 For example, horizontal price that reduces output in markets characterized by negative 
externalities can increase efficiency.  See Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through 
Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 
243 (1993). 
239 But see Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.Supp. 384, (D. Del. 1978) (In “establishing 
instead a rule of reason with respect to vertical restraints, Sylvania does not stand for the 
proposition that such restraints are per se legal.”) 
240  (page 10 of Breyer’s dissent). 
241   Dan Crane argues that the prospect of treble damages for antitrust violations means that 
antitrust is “powerfully structured to deter violations.”  Crane, supra note __, at 89.  For a 
contrary view, explaining why standing doctrines and other antitrust limits mean that treble 
damages often under-deter, see Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be 
Raised, 16 Loyola Cons. L. Rev. 329 (2004); Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust 
Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. Rev. 651 (2006).  In our view, Lande has the better of this argument.  
While the prospect of treble damages can deter conduct, and therefore avoid false negatives, the 
deterrence calculus must take into account the difficulties of proving an antitrust case, and the 
low likelihood of success facing antitrust plaintiffs.  To take just one example, Hammer and 
Sage’s comprehensive study of health care antitrust litigation found that plaintiffs win only 14% 
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More generally, categorical approaches produce inaccurate outcomes.  
Unfortunately, plaintiffs have a powerful incentive to create false positives, and 
defendants have a corresponding incentive to create false negatives.  Of course, plaintiffs 
want to create true positives and defendants true negatives as well.  Often, both sides in 
litigation sincerely believe that their position is correct.  But litigants are generally more 
concerned with winning than the court reaching the “right” result.  Given these 
incentives, categorical analysis can distract the court from focusing on the actual or likely 
economic effects of the challenged restraint, as both plaintiffs and defendants may argue 
that effects are irrelevant – plaintiffs because the restraint is horizontal and therefore 
unreasonable as a matter of law, and defendants because their conduct was vertical and 
thus necessarily harmless.  And the fact that many cases don’t fit easily within a 
particular box, or that some different categories cover the same conduct, gives lawyers 
ample opportunity to game this system.  The prospect of strategic behavior by both 
antitrust plaintiffs and defendants to fit their case within a favorable box further distorts 
outcomes away from efficiency.242   
Second, courts often spend more time on the categorization process than they 
would on the process of performing proper analysis of the competitive effects of a 
challenged restraint.  This negates the supposed efficiency advantages of categorization.  
                                                                                                                                            
of the antitrust cases in the health care industry.  Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, 
Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 545, 575 (2002).  While health care 
cases may be unrepresentative, it is certainly not the case that plaintiffs in any field are winning 
antitrust cases in droves in the modern era. 
242   For this reason, we think Crane has it backwards when he suggests that standards rather than 
rules are more likely to lead to strategic behavior and public choice concerns.  Crane, supra note 
__, at 97-98. Long experience has shown that it is narrow rules and Congress and administrative 
agencies that are more subject to public choice worries than the judiciary.  A standard based on 
efficiency is particularly hard to manipulate by strategic behavior.  As we note below, however, 
we do agree with Crane about the importance of some screens to weed out frivolous claims and 
defenses without putting the parties to great expense. 
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For example, courts invest their energies asking, “Does the conduct fall in the category 
‘group boycott’ or not?  If so, does it fall in the per se category?”  As courts focus on the 
horizontal-vertical debate, they miss sight of the true purpose of antitrust law: 
condemning restraints that unreasonably reduce consumer welfare.  Professor Baker has 
astutely observed that “the business certainty and litigation cost reduction benefits of per 
se rules are easy to overstate. The fight over characterization -- determining which 
pigeonhole -- can involve as much cost, can generate as little business certainty, as a full-
blown analysis of reasonableness.”243  Far from generating efficiencies and saving 
judicial resources, courts can expend more time attempting to characterize a restraint than 
it would take to actually analyze the competitive effects of the challenged agreement.244  
And at the end of the day, the information this fight will have produced is far less useful 
than would be the results of a direct inquiry into competitive effects. 
Third, while categorical reasoning and per se rules are supposed to increase 
predictability and consistency, these benefits of categorical analysis have gone largely 
unrealized.  Shifting categories that leave ill-defined categories in their wakes reduce the 
predictability and clarity of antitrust doctrine.  While the Court may find the virtue of 
flexibility in its admission that there is often no “bright line separating per se from rule of 
reason analysis,”245 in the context of a categorical legal framework, the result is mass 
confusion.  While some restraints are condemned without any analysis of their probable 
                                                
243 Jonathan Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Restraints, 36 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 733, 740 n.29 (1991)). 
244 HOVENKAMP (“ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE”), supra note __ at 115 (“So conduct must be 
characterized before it can be made subject to the per se rule. Furthermore, the characterization 
process must be less costly than a full rule of reason analysis. Otherwise the per se rule would be 
pointless. If determining that something ought to be governed by the per se rule is just as costly as 
applying the rule of reason, then we haven't saved anything.”). 
245 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 
(1984) 
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effects, in “other cases, [courts] have ignored seemingly intractable antitrust principles in 
refusing to apply the per se rule to restraints that likely would have been categorized as 
per se offenses in the not-so-distant past. As a result, we are left with no clearly 
discernible rule to govern application of the per se rule.”246  On a practical level, this lack 
of clarity can make it harder for antitrust plaintiffs to get a good attorney, as lawyers are 
reluctant to invest the necessary resources in a case whose course and outcome is so 
uncertain.247   
Finally, error costs – false positives and false negatives – must be balanced 
against administrative benefits.  Bright-line rules may be acceptable, despite their error 
costs, because they conserve judicial resources.  However, the error costs associated with 
the categorical approach in antitrust are not offset by administrative savings because, as 
we have shown, categorical analysis often requires more effort than an inquiry into the 
actual competitive effects of a challenged restraint.  In short, the categorical approach 
entails both error costs and administrative costs – the worst of both worlds. 
 
  
 All of this suggests that the approach to categorization is not cost-beneficial.  
Categorization serves an important role when it simplifies the analysis.  However, when 
courts spend as much time trying to categorize the conduct as they would determining its 
actual competitive consequences, then categorization is a net negative – it produces 
                                                
246 ABA RULE OF REASON MONOGRAPH, supra note xx at 12. 
247  ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 13, TREBLE DAMAGES REMEDY (1986) (“The 
necessary economic incentive for a plaintiff and its attorney may not be supplied by a system that 
only compensates the plaintiff for its actual damages if it wins, because such a system may not 
provide sufficient return to overcome the risks of litigation."‘ Particularly for complex, uncertain 
litigation-such as rule of-reason cases-a multiplier may be necessary to induce the necessary 
expenditures to develop evidence sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof.”). 
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inaccurate outcomes without the cost savings or predictability promised by bright-line 
rules.  Currently, lawyers and judges spend an inordinate amount of time attempting to 
characterize a restraint along a variety of dimensions.  For example, in the cases 
discussed in Part Two, courts focused a lot of time on determining whether the restraint is 
more appropriately categorized as horizontal or vertical.  This misses the forest for the 
trees.  Categorization takes the courts’ time and attention but does not necessarily achieve 
better results than a rule of reason analysis. Except in a few special cases, courts should 
focus on competitive effects, not on how the restraint is characterized.   
 
 C. On the Correct Use of Categories in Antitrust 
 
While the purpose of this Article is to expose the overreliance on and misuse of 
categorical analysis in antitrust jurisprudence, it would be improper to criticize the 
current use of categories in antitrust without offering suggestions for courts on how to 
consider categories when evaluating antitrust claims.  However, the goal of this section is 
not to advance a new overarching basis for antitrust jurisprudence – that is a separate 
article, more ambitious than this effort.  Rather, our goal is more modest – to provide an 
overview of how courts should approach antitrust issues without over-relying on 
categories. 
 
 Any use of categorical analysis in antitrust decision-making should be performed 
with an eye toward the goals of antitrust law: to detect and deter trade restraints that 
unreasonably reduce output, raise price, or diminish competition with respect to quality, 
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innovation, or consumer choice.  When categorical reasoning does not help the decision-
maker identify and condemn unreasonable trade restraints, such an approach is at best 
unnecessary and at worst counterproductive, causing courts to reach incorrect results and 
creating confusion within the business community, including those who genuinely want 
to operate within the law. 
 
 To insure the proper use of categorical analysis, this section argues that courts 
should do three things: (1) forego categorizing restraints when the plaintiff proves 
anticompetitive effects through direct evidence; (2) properly define the contours of 
antitrust categories based on empirical evidence; and (3) constrain the use of categorical 
scrutiny when performing rule of reason analysis. 
 
1. When Antitrust Analysis Should Eschew Categories 
 
Categorical analysis is useful when it appropriately simplifies analysis that would 
otherwise be overly complex.  But categorical analysis is not always necessary or 
appropriate.  The process of characterizing a challenged restraint along the various 
vectors of horizontal versus vertical and price versus nonprice has become the default 
starting point in much antitrust analysis.  While it may be second nature to categorize, 
judicial efficiency can be maximized if other things are considered first. 
 
Categorical analysis is intended to help judges determined whether or not the 
challenge conduct is likely to cause anticompetitive effects.  But there is no need to 
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engage in categorical analysis when plaintiffs present direct evidence of anticompetitive 
effects.  In addition, the court need not engage in the taxing and often expensive process 
of defining the relevant product and geographic market, determining whether or not the 
defendants have market power within that market.248 
 
While some courts have indicated that a plaintiff can rely on evidence of direct 
economic effects in lieu of defining the relevant market and proving that the defendants 
have sufficient market power to unreasonably restrain trade,249 other courts have sought 
to limit the role of direct evidence of economic effect, while overemphasizing a 
categorical approach.250  The Seventh Circuit has held that direct evidence can substitute 
for economic theory only in horizontal, not vertical, restraints.251  This approach is 
flawed: direct evidence of anticompetitive effects should be sufficient to establish the 
plaintiff's prima facie case regardless of whether or the restraint is categorized as 
horizontal or vertical.  The Seventh Circuit rule makes the antitrust analysis turn on 
irrelevant categorization.  If the plaintiff has direct evidence of anticompetitive effects, 
then the parties will necessarily engage in a heated debate as to whether the restraint at 
issue is horizontal or vertical.  The plaintiff must establish that the restraint is horizontal 
in order to ensure that its direct evidence will be sufficient to establish the prima facie 
case.  And, conversely, the defendant will argue that the restraint is vertical and therefore 
the presence of direct evidence is not dispositive.  This elevates form over substance as 
                                                
248 The defendant may still be able to argue an efficiency defense, but this currently takes place outside of 
categorical contours, as it should. 
249   See, e.g., Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460 (circumstantial evidence of market power is 
but a “surrogate” for direct evidence of market effects); Toys’r’Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
250   See Republic Tobacco Co. v. North Atlantic Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2004). 
251 Id. 
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the parties debate how to categorize a restraint even when the court has direct evidence 
on the ultimate question that categorization is intended to help answer: Did the restraint 
cause anticompetitive effects?  The categorization debate in such cases is at best a red 
herring that wastes judicial and party resources on an unnecessary and complicated 
inquiry; at worst, the risk of false negatives is magnified as courts ignore direct evidence 
in favor of irrelevant disputes about characterization.   
 
We believe that the problems with categorization can be minimized if antitrust 
law pays more attention to direct evidence of anticompetitive effects, rather than focusing 
on putting conduct into a particular category, and then reasoning from the category into 
which it has been put whether or not there are in theory likely to be anticompetitive 
effects.252  By championing categorical analysis, the Seventh Circuit approach too 
quickly discounts reliable evidence of actual economic effects.253  This is a mistake 
because, as we have seen, the categories that are the basis for this economic reasoning are 
uncertain, problematic, and subject to manipulation. 
 
2. Categorization Should Have an Empirical Basis 
 
 Categories should reflect the wisdom of empirical evidence.  This is particularly 
important when the categorical label is dispositive, as the per se rule is.  The Supreme 
Court has asserted that “[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business 
                                                
252    See Dennis Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 1 (2007). 
253 While some may argue that such evidence might be manipulated, direct evidence is less malleable than 
current categorical labels. 
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relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.”254  The 
per se rule attempts to convert judicial experience into a labor-saving device: after courts 
have seen a particular type of restraint and have condemned it repeatedly under a rule of 
reason analysis, that category of restraint warrants per se condemnation because courts 
can “predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.”255  In theory, this 
also means that the lack of judicial experience with a category of restraints means the 
court will apply the rule of reason.256   
 
 Despite such paeans to empiricism, federal courts do not always create categories 
based on empirical evidence and judicial experience.  For example, federal courts have 
condemned tying arrangements as nominally per se illegal for decades without any 
empirical proof that tying always or almost always unreasonably restrain competition in 
the market for the tied product.  Similarly, the Supreme Court in Maricopa County 
Medical Society condemned maximum price fixing agreements, the majority being 
“unpersuaded by the argument that we should not apply the per se rule in this case 
                                                
254 U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) (citing Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in 
Antitrust Law, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1165 (1964)); see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (quoting Topco). 
255 Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); see State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 
(1997) (quoting Maricopa County); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 
(1990) (same); F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990) (same). 
 The abbreviated rule of reason is based on experience as well. See California Dental Ass'n v. 
F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (“The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so 
clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will 
follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.”). 
256 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) 
(“experience hardly counsels that we should outlaw the blanket license as a per se restraint of trade.”); 
Appalachian Coals v. U.S., 288 U.S. 344, 377 (1933) (“Nothing in theory or experience indicates that the 
selection of a common selling agency to represent a number of producers should be deemed to be more 
abnormal than the formation of a huge corporation bringing various independent units into one 
ownership.”); cf. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 
U.S. 85, 1001984) (“we have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case. This 
decision is not based on a lack of judicial experience with this type of arrangement…”). 
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because the judiciary has little antitrust experience in the health care industry.”257  The 
Court had not developed empirical evidence about the anticompetitive effects of 
maximum price-fixing agreements in general.  But that did not stop the court from 
putting such agreements in the per se category.  
   
 
 Applying an empirical test, at least some trade restraints clearly belong in the per 
se category, most notably bid-rigging, cartel agreements to fix a minimum price, and 
agreements to artificially reduce output.  Federal courts have over a century’s worth of 
empirical evidence that shows that cartels raise price, reducing consumer welfare and 
creating inefficiency.258 Similarly, bid-rigging schemes increase the cost of government 
contracts, draining the public coffers without any offsetting efficiency gains.  These types 
of agreements are properly categorized as per se illegal because the empirical evidence 
comports with that legal conclusion. 
 
 Of course, an empirical approach can also support the creation of categories of 
conduct that are per se legal.  Nonexclusive patent licenses, for instance, are restraints of 
trade, but long experience has taught that they are not unreasonable restraints of trade, 
and the grant of a patent license is not itself problematic.259  Similarly, a unilateral 
                                                
257 457 U.S. at 349. 
258   One problem with the current approach to empiricism is the limited construction of what constitutes 
relevant empirical data.  The Court has articulated a standard based on judicial experience.  The concept of 
empiricism should be expanded to include economic case studies performed by qualified academics.  Case 
studies can represent a fount of in-depth and dependable information.  Incorporating non-judicial sources of 
reliable empirical data would save courts from having to engage in repeated costly rule of reason analyses 
before having sufficient data that a category of restraint warrants per se treatment. 
259   U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property sec. 3.1 (1995). 
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decision to set a nonpredatory price is legal per se, because antitrust law has concluded 
that even if artificially high prices reduce social welfare in some circumstances, the costs 
of judicial scrutiny of the myriad pricing decisions made by dominant firms would far 
exceed the benefits.  Such conduct is per se legal because we have considerable empirical 
data that such agreements and pricing decisions do not reduce output or raise price; 
indeed, they tend to have the opposite effect.  As with per se illegal conduct, challenged 
restraints shold not fall into the per se category until sufficient empirical evidence – in the 
form of reliable case studies and/or litigation – demonstrates that the type of restraint 
does not unreasonably restrain competition.  Theory alone should not move agreements 
into the safe harbor of per se legality.  Rather, agreements should be categorized 
according to their empirically demonstrated procompetitive or anticompetitive effects. 
 
 But whether developing rules for per se legality or illegality, antitrust courts 
should create categories only when the facts warrant it. If antitrust analysis leads to 
consistent results across a range of circumstances – if particular conduct is always 
harmful, never harmful, or harmful only in a defined class of cases – then the creation of 
an antitrust rule is appropriate. But one of the lessons of Part II is that even then courts 
are not done. Factual circumstances can change, and categorizing new conduct merely by 
analogizing it to previously categorized conduct is insufficient if the new conduct has 
different economic effects.  Reasoning by analogy is not empirical analysis and is not 
helpful if the debate over how to analogize and categorize overshadows the more 
important inquiry into a restraint’s effects on competitive conditions.   
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 Properly understood, therefore, even bright-line rules require detailed antitrust 
analysis into the economic effects of the conduct at issue. It is just that that analysis 
occurs in bulk rather than on a case-by-case basis.  Further, courts need to be far more 
sensitive than they have been to the possibility of gaming the rules they create or making 
inefficient changes in behavior in order to fit within an established category.   
 
3. The Clarity of Categories and Antitrust Analysis Beyond the Constraints of 
Categories 
 
Most restraints will not fall in a per se category.  Particular conduct will have 
different one potential anticompetitive effects based on many market characteristics: the 
number, market share, product diversification, and financial strength of competitors; the 
response of consumers, competitors, and venture capitalists to particular circumstances; 
and the structure, regulatory environment, time to market, and barriers to entry in the 
particular industry, to name but a few. All these characteristics vary from market to 
market.260  Thus, context is important for determining whether or not a particular restraint 
is unreasonably anti-competitive.  The Supreme Court essentially recognized this in 
Sylvania when it declared that “departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based 
upon demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”261   
 
                                                
260   See Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets 
and Measuring Market Power, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931225 
(working paper 2006) (arguing that antitrust should take into account the empirical economic learning on 
how market effects differ by industry). 
261   Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).  
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If a challenged trade restraint does not appropriately belong in a per se category, 
then courts apply rule of reason analysis.  Under the rule of reason, the fact finder must 
determine whether or not the challenge restraint unreasonably reduces output or injures 
price or nonprice competition.  It is here -- during the rule of reason discussion -- that 
courts sometimes over-rely on categorical analysis as a dangerous crutch.   
 
Proper application of the rule of reason need not – and generally should not – 
involve categorical analysis.  The most important components of a thorough rule of 
reason analysis do not require reliance on categories but on particular evidence about the 
nature and effects of a particular restraint in a particular market context.  Assuming that 
the challenged restraint does not fall within a per se category – and is not so facially 
anticompetitive that it warrants condemnation under the quick look – the court should 
inquire into the defendants’ market power.262  Firms without market power are unlikely to 
reduce output or increase price in a consequential way.   Thus, in the absence of any 
meaningful market power the court can dispose of the case without additional categorical 
analysis being performed doing a rule of reason application. 
 
 If the defendants do collectively possess market power, then the court must 
determine whether the challenged agreement is likely to produce anticompetitive effects.   
Once the court reaches this step in the rule of reason, categories can provide insights but 
should not be dispositive.  The empirical evidence suggests that a horizontal price 
restraint is more likely to have anticompetitive effects than a comparable vertical 
                                                
262 Of course, if the plaintiff can prove actual anticompetitive effects from the challenge restraint, then 
courts can condemn the restraint without elaborate inquiry into market definition and market power. 
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nonprice restraint.  But this insights applies to restraints that are clearly horizontal and 
price-related (such as, price-fixing among competitors) or clearly vertical and not price-
related (such as a manufacturer’s assignment of territorial responsibilities among its 
distributors).  If a challenged restraint is not neatly fit with in a recognized category, then 
court should not invest significant time and effort trying to pigeonhole the restraint.  
Categorical analysis is only appropriate if it accurately and efficiently simplifies the 
adjudication process.  However, as Part Two illustrated, the process of characterizing 
challenged restraint along a variety of categorical boxes often introduces more confusion 
than clarity. 
 
 The remainder of the rule of reason process need not involve any reference to 
antitrust categories.  If the plaintiff can establish the defendants' market power and prove 
a prima facie case that the restraint is likely to have an anticompetitive effect, the 
defendant is given the opportunity to show that the restraint also creates meaningful 
efficiencies that could not be realized in the absence of the restraint – in other words, the 
efficiencies cannot be realized through a less restrictive alternative.  Presented with the 
plaintiff's prima facie case of anticompetitive effects and the defendant's colorable claim 
of efficiencies, the court should engage in a balancing process to determine whether or 
not the likely anticompetitive effects outweigh the probable efficiencies from the 
restraint. 
 
Our objective in this Article is not to describe a legal test for how courts should 
perform this balancing – or how to define markets, how to assess market power, or how 
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to evaluate efficiency claims. Our goal is simply to convince federal judges not to over-
rely on the comfort of categories when performing rule of reason analysis.  Judges should 
recognize that none of the steps in a proper rule of reason analysis – market definition, 
market power, anticompetitive effects, efficiency arguments, or balancing – requires the 
court to employ categorical reasoning. 
The thrust of our argument is to explain why categorical analysis in antitrust 
jurisprudence is flawed.  Our focus in this Article is more on diagnosis and less on 
treatment.  Eminent scholars like Herb Hovenkamp have proposed frameworks for 
evaluating trade restraints under section one.  Unfortunately, federal judges are unlikely 
to adopt new, more appropriate legal tests absent an appreciation of why their current 
approach is inefficient and misguided.  This Article attempts to give impetus to 
alternative approaches by showing how categorical gives merely the illusion of precision 






 Like the early classifications performed during the Enlightenment, the process of 
classifying trade restraints proved to be a valuable tool in early deliberations about how 
to determine what conduct should be considered unreasonable and thus violative of 
antitrust laws.  But, over time, as categories have shifted and become subject to 
manipulation, they no longer accurately describe competitive conditions.  Blind reliance 
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on the categories of yesteryear unnecessarily complicates antitrust litigation, creates 
inaccurate results, and creates perverse incentives for American businesses.  Antitrust 
jurisprudence would benefit significantly from a re-examination of antitrust categories, 
including the abandonment of out-moded characterizations and assumptions, coupled 
with a greater reliance on empirical evidence to hone more apt rules and better applied 
standards.   
 Only if courts keep the goals of the antitrust inquiry firmly in mind can they avoid 
being distracted by the allure of ultimately empty boxes.  It’s not important whether the 
platypus is a reptile or a mammal; what’s important is that it’s a platypus. 
 
